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THE PHILIPPINES' CHINA POLICY

IN THE DUTERTE PRESIDENCY, 2016-2020

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NEIGHBORLY ACCOMMODATION: THE PHILIPPINES' CHINA POLICY IN THE DUTERTE PRESIDENCY, 2016-2020[1]

PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY

The phrase "independent foreign policy" argued to be the proper description of Philippine statecraft towards great powers since 2016, is a borrowed and derivative concept. This paper will provide an empirical sketch of Duterte's foreign policy to demonstrate two interrelated arguments: how the Philippines is not employing a policy of hedging, and that the country is accommodating China instead, which thus challenge the supposed independence of Philippines' foreign policy.

China has occupied a historically dominant position in the East Asian region. Its reemergence and "awakening" in the post-Cold War era during the time of American power preponderance in the region, spawned a discussion about how best to predict what foreign policy strategies secondary states like Southeast Asian states will pursue, and what would be the most beneficial behavior for states to follow in light of the new potential threats and opportunities. These two analytical concerns—predictive and practical—have also been at the center of heated debates in 21st century global affairs outside of the Southeast Asian geographical focus. There is a third concern, especially among scholars, to explain why states are exhibiting the behavior they appear to be doing and why these behaviors demonstrate dynamic changes or stable continuity overtime. These questions will be almost impossible to understand if a more fundamental question has not been tackled: how do we most accurately describe what states are doing in responding to China's reemergence in the region? In this paper, we ask this question in the context of the Philippines, one of the puzzling cases in East Asian international relations, owing to the sharp discontinuity of foreign policy approach towards the two great powers in the region in light of the domestic electoral transition in 2016. How do we best describe President Duterte's foreign policy towards China and the United States, from 2016 to 2020?

More specifically, the concern raised here is how to most accurately describe the foreign policy approach the Philippines has pursued under President Rodrigo Duterte by placing the twin assertations that the Philippines has pursued a policy of "hedging" and "independent foreign policy" in conversation with the recent studies on the balance of power politics in the field of international relations. I argue that Philippine foreign policy under the Duterte administration is not a policy of hedging. Hedging is argued here as strategic ambiguity, but the Philippines's foreign policy can be described as that of accommodation from 2016 to 2020. This challenges thus the arguments of analysts and government officials. This paper does not stake a moral position about the foreign policy of the Philippines but argues that an accurate description is fundamental to realizing foreign policy goals.

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RISING POWERS AND ALIGNMENT STRATEGIES

Conventional international relations view rising powers as a threat because they obstruct the established order, and disrupt the benefits other states accrue from it. Based on this, a leading analysis is that countries will choose the side of the established power to avoid rising powers from seeking complete domination and hegemony in a region. This "balancing" behavior can be contrasted with another perspective, where countries will choose to "bandwagon" or choose the side of the rising power. These strategies are mutually exclusive and are part of two opposite poles of a spectrum. One of the widely accepted definitions of these two behaviors was established by Stephen Walt in his seminal contribution to the balance of power debate. In what he calls as a "balance of threat," Walt defines balancing as "allying with others against a prevailing threat" and bandwagoning to that of the "alignment with the source of danger" (Walt 1987:17).

That balancing instead of bandwagoning is supposedly a staple behavior among big countries, smaller or secondary states have been argued not to be an exception to this prediction (Rothstein, 1968). In Southeast Asia, this is to say that countries will choose the side of the United States as the established power, for fear of China's increasingly dominant position in the East Asian international order.

However, many have pointed out that this black and white dichotomy of balancing or bandwagoning behavior is not empirically supported for both big powers and secondary states, especially in the context of Asia. The argument is that there are strategies that lie in the wide array of foreign policy options between balancing and bandwagoning. For example, David Kang (2003, 2004) has repeatedly demonstrated that Asian states exhibited different behaviors than the standard expectation of bandwagoning and balancing would suggest. Like many Asian states, South Korea, for instance, had pursued a policy of "accommodation" towards China at the time when China was increasing its material strength (Kang, 2009) and where the United States had preponderant power in the region. The empirical challenge to this balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy is also seen in analyses of Southeast Asian behavior in the context of great power politics in the region. The point has been that for most of contemporary international history, many, if not all, secondary Southeast Asian states have been pursuing a strategy of "hedging" in navigating the uncertain waters of great power competition (Goh 2005; Kuik 2016).

UNDERSTANDING ACCOMMODATION AND HEDGING

While the terms are contested, there is some agreement that at least two other options exist in the continuum of possible alignment options for a country in light of the great power competition in their region: "hedging" and "accommodation." Both accommodation and hedging policy in East Asian international relations have provided a rethinking of an otherwise pessimistic global conversation about impending violence brought about by the complicated US-China relationship.

Hedging is seen to be a policy that lies in between balancing and bandwagoning, or a policy that may involve any combination of cooperation or confrontation (Haacke 2019; Medeiros 2010).[2] If viewed from this definition, the term "hedging" would have the tendency to be used loosely , making it vulnerable to inaccurate and incorrect usage. (Ciorciari and Haacke 2019: 368). As I will demonstrate in the next sections, this mistake was made in describing the strategy of the Philippines. Specifically, the term hedging has been inaccurately used by some analysts and government officials in describing the Philippine foreign policy of President Rodrigo Duterte.

More importantly, if hedging is any form of alignment strategy between balancing and bandwagoning, it ignores the other possible type of alignment strategy—accommodation. As such, I borrow Kang's nomenclature, where hedging is a policy closer to balancing behavior, and accommodation is closer to that bandwagoning. According to this framework, a country's choice of foreign policy strategy is influenced by how much fear a country has towards the other. Fear or its absence, for that matter, is a crucial variable in a country's decision to bandwagon, accommodate, hedge, or balance. Fear from uncertainty has occupied a central position in international politics because it is a prime driver of state behavior. However, why would states have less fear and decide to pursue a policy of accommodation or even bandwagoning? Refer to Figure 1.

FIGURE 1 . A SPECTRUM OF ALIGNMENT STRATEGIES



SOURCE: KANG (2009, P. 8)

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The discussion about what constitutes a foreign policy of accommodation necessitates a two-step process. The first step is delineating accommodation with its closest conceptual rival, hedging. This step is crucial, mainly because policymakers in the Philippines tend to wrongly conflate hedging with accommodation, for perhaps political purposes or cognitive gaps, or both. Once we establish what hedging is and what it is not, the second step is to what constitutes an accommodation policy by identifying the evidential or empirical categories that are required for this type of foreign policy.

DEFINING HEDGING AND ACCOMMODATION

In the academic literature of hedging, the most common definition is that hedging is an approach that signifies any combination of balancing or bandwagoning, or cooperative and confrontational behavior (see Kuik, 2008, 2017; Haacke, 2019; Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019). Similar to this definition are those that premise hedging on "diversification" and "equidistance." However as several scholars have pointed out (Haacke 2019; Lim and Cooper 2015: 702), these definitions are problematic because they may suffer from "conceptual looseness," or that they are too broad and could mean anything short of bandwagoning or balancing, thus limiting its analytic value and making it prone to misuse. Moreover, previous studies that describe hedging as diversification and equidistance are also problematic because countries may diversify or be equidistant for reasons other than to pursue security or opportunities, and also, "equidistance" is hard to measure, (Haacke, 2019). Furthermore, I argue that this is also problematic because it ignores other strategies in between two poles that may not necessarily conform to hedging---in this case, accommodation as conceptualized in the framework above, but also other strategies identified by other scholars.[3]

While Kuik's definition generally supports the "mixed-policy" approach in other places (2008, 2013), one of the definitions he deployed more recently (2016a) defines hedging as an "insurance-seeking behavior under high-stakes and uncertain situations, where a sovereign actor pursues a bundle of opposite and deliberately ambiguous policies vis-à-vis competing powers to prepare a fallback position should circumstances change." This idea is supported by other scholars such as Shambaugh, who defines hedging as "more neutralist, ambiguous and flexible" (2018: 94) to not "having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another." (Goh 2005: 2). Likewise, Lim and Cooper (2015: 703) argues that hedging "is a class of behaviors which signal ambiguity regarding great power alignment."

The deliberate and designed effort to signal confusing and opaque state intentions demonstrated through mixed behavior is the final arbiter for whether a state is hedging, and whether it is not. As such, hedging can be defined as a secondary state's efforts to be strategically ambiguous or to signal neither clear and objective alignment with any great power.

Accommodation may be referred to as the "attempts to cooperate and craft stability that are short of slavish bandwagoning" (Kang 2009: 7). As mentioned above, bandwagoning can be seen as aligning with another country that is the source of threat. In a later work, Walt (1988: 55) elaborates bandwagoning and clarifies that "it involves unequal exchange; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. Most important of all, bandwagoning suggests a willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally". Gleaning from these accounts, accommodation may be seen as an alignment strategy involving asymmetrical concessions and tolerating actions that may not necessarily be in the interest of the weaker state for the purpose of inducing cooperation and stability. While the weaker state condones these concessions and illegitimate actions by the threatening state for material trade-offs, the weaker state may not necessarily willingly accept these actions.

NO, THE PHILIPPINES IS NOT HEDGING: DUTERTE'S ACCOMMODATION OF CHINA

Among the Southeast Asian secondary states, which are beset with a rising China, only Singapore is seen as consistently hedging (Haacke 2019: 386).

Meanwhile, the favorable stance of the Philippines towards China was not straightforward. After Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's supposed "golden age" of Philippine-China relations, it was punctuated by a policy of confrontation of President Noynoy Aquino as it sued against China in international arbitration over the South China Sea, which the Philippines won, and China continues to reject. But there are some mixed views on the country's foreign policy towards China during the Aquino administration from 2010 to 2016. However, there is a consensus that the election of the new Philippine president almost half a decade ago marked a sharp turning point in the country's foreign policy towards China.

Philippine foreign policy should be conceived as somewhere in the middle space between the two policies. The issue among scholars is where in this space between balancing and bandwagoning does the Philippines fall under. The official narrative of the Philippine government has described this new foreign policy as an "independent foreign policy" that some scholars, analysts, and diplomats have argued as akin to "hedging." For example, the ideas of an "independent foreign policy" and "hedging" were both used in a speech at a Rotary Club by Chito Sta. Romana, the Philippine Ambassador to China (Mayuga, 2016). The premise in both hedging and the independent foreign policy assertion is underpinned by the belief that the Philippines has pursued opportunities and recognized threats between the United States and China equally.

As the previous discussion above has argued, the international relations literature defines hedging to be that of strategic ambiguity.

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The main objective of this paper is to investigate whether the assertion that the Philippines is hedging is invoked correctly in light of the international relations academic literature on hedging. It challenges the assertion that the Philippines pursued a policy of hedging, and argues that in the continuum of possible alignment options, Philippine foreign policy since 2016 can be more accurately described to be a policy of accommodation towards China. The article distinguishes "hedging" and "accommodation" options and carefully examines Philippine accommodation policy to China in presidential discourses, trade statistics, and military exchange between the US, China, and the Philippines.

DUTERTE'S CHINA ACCOMMODATION: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

The phrase "independent foreign policy," argued to be the proper description of Philippine statecraft towards great powers since 2016, is a borrowed and derivative concept. First, it is enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution that was forged during the presidency of Corazon Aquino after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos. Second, other Southeast Asian countries also use the term (Murphy, 2017). The following discussion will provide an empirical sketch of Duterte's foreign policy to demonstrate two interrelated arguments: how the Philippines is not employing a policy of hedging, and that the country is accommodating China instead, which thus challenge the supposed independence of Philippines foreign policy. This is demonstrated through several data dimensions.

The first data set is symbolic and discursive evidence because words matter in international relations as it constructs reality but also reveals state interests and intentions that could provide evidence to its strategy (Haacke 2019: 395-395). The second type of evidence is economic data, specifically in the inflow of capital and investments, whether in the form of materialized or pledged investments. Foreign

direct investments (FDI) allow us to measure the level of openness of the Philippine government towards the economic incentives China is using as statecraft. Among the three types of investments from China—state investments, private investments, and illicit capital—the amount of state investments from China to a receiving country like the Philippines are mainly based on the quality of the two countries' political relationship (Camba 2015: 4). Precisely because the investment decisions of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOE's) are controlled directly by the Chinese government, and their entry is directly decided at the highest level of the Philippine government, the increase in SOE investment is an explicit demonstration of the Philippine government's willingness to pursue a positive relationship with China. Finally, in the security dimension, the paper tracks the activities of the Philippines in alliance management with the United States and China in the context of the threats in the South China Sea posed by China.

DISCOURSE IN POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS AND DIPLOMATIC PROTESTS

In Duterte's discursive efforts in foreign policy, what we can see is a consistency about what he says about China but fluctuation about the United States and other western powers. At the beginning of his presidency, Rodrigo Duterte made world news as he launched a series of tirades versus Western powers and western-backed institutions. It is well known that he referred to President Barack Obama and the Pope with derogatory terms on separate occasions. On another occasion, he used the same derogatory language towards the United Nations and threatened to withdraw from the international group (Koren, 2016). Withdrawing from an important alliance was also launched against the United States, one of the Philippines' most important ally. In October 2016, in Beijing with businessmen and political audience, President Duterte said, "I announce my separation from the United States" and that it is Russia, China, and the Philippines "against the world"

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(ABS-CBN News, 2016). Aside from the anti-imperial tendencies, Duterte mentions that "if America cared, it would have sent its aircraft carriers and missile frigates the moment China started reclaiming land in contested territory, but no such thing happened," referring to his perception that the United States is unwilling to stake a mortal stand against the Philippines versus China (Lacorte, 2015b). In this context, Duterte emphasizes that he does not want the help of the United States—" we can't fight a war with China because we don't have arms, so, we'll be forced to ask the help of the United States because that's the only force that has the capability to fight the Chinese, but we don't want to do that, that's why we're asking the Chinese not to make any trouble." The important nuance here is that the president is willing to kowtow to China. In 2018, he called the European Union "stupid" and said that it should "go to hell" noting the conditionalities tied to the aid that it was giving to the Philippines (Tubeza 2018).

It is common that Duterte takes back or softens the previous utterances as he did for the statements above. However, what he does not backtrack are his pronouncements about China. As President Duterte has spoken warmer rhetoric when speaking about China and Russia, he does this to refer to his personal experience of being able to "talk more candidly with the Chinese than with the Americans" (Lacorte, 2015a). As Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency, he had shelved the momentous arbitral case that the Philippines had won against China in the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the previous administration. Symbolically, he also reverted to using the label "South China Sea" instead of the "West Philippine Sea." By around two years into office, Duterte had already visited China five (5) times, and President Xi Jinping visited the Philippines in a rare move.

While these are communicative accounts from the early presidency of Duterte, these shadows the president's perceptions that carried over for the whole four years in office. Duterte has also toned down his fiery rhetoric in 2019 and 2020, perhaps after being warned by members of the security establishment. These early examples also amply show us that the president is not utilizing "strategic ambiguity"—the Philippines did follow through with the greater commercial and security alignment with China. That President Duterte says one thing about the United States but does another is not strategic ambiguity, rather it is transparent indecisiveness, confusion, and carelessness—perhaps no other adjectives can mean otherwise to being strategic. Thus, to the extent that it may signal ambiguity to other observers, it is not strategic, deliberate, or systematic. Instead, it may be emotional, intuitive, and spur of the moment. If the Philippines were serious about hedging, it would include China in its fiery rhetoric and pursue a deliberate attempt to cultivate the perception of hesitation in Chinese investments and other areas. Rhetoric is one good way to pursue this.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS FROM CHINA

President Duterte did walk the talk with China. One of the crowning jewels of this supposed hedging, is the successful wooing of Chinese capital in the Philippines through foreign direct investments and development aid, at least in terms of pledges. The 2016 state visit of Duterte to China saw the consummation of 24 agreements, the signing of memorandum of agreements worth US$ 15 Billion, and the Philippines securing around US$ 9 Billion worth of loans. More than the investment size, Chinese businesses are involved in important Philippine interests like railways, dams, and other utilities that are of strategic importance. Moreover, the proximity of Chinese businesses to the Philippine government has become closer for instance where Chinese businesses had a hard time participating in Philippine government projects during the Aquino administration, under the Duterte administration Chinese businesses could participate extensively (Camba 2017).

The Philippine government also facilitated the entry of Chinese tourists in the Philippines and became one of the fastest-growing groups where the Philippines receive tourists. A promise from China, tourism grew manyfold since Duterte took office (Camba 2017), as shown in Figure 2.

FIGURE 2 . COMPARISON OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES



SOURCE: THE AUTHOR'S OWN

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Chinese investments in the Philippines, including pledges, have increased significantly over almost a decade. The sharp turning point was in the year 2017, Duterte's first year in office. It was a relatively short period of time to build the groundwork for a complete turnaround from the previous administration, which saw a strained economic relationship from the legal confrontation with China. The investments of the United States, on the other hand, would seem to represent a declining trend. While the decline in US investments did occur even prior to the Duterte administration, the data from 2017 to 2019 looked very similar to the 2010 investment data, which had been the time the country had recently experienced the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Both the temporal dimensions in foreign direct investments.

This data on foreign direct investment outflows, inflows, and pledges can also be complemented with firm registrations in the Philippines, as seen in a novel data set collected and analyzed by Camba and Magat (2020) that directly approximate actual foreign direct investments in the Philippines. Because firms have to show bank statements, actual remit capitalization requirements to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and go through an arduous process of firm registration, FDI can be better measured by firm registration.

As illustrated in Figure 3, the number of firms that have Chinese investors have likewise significantly increased. There is an upward trend from the Arroyo administration to Duterte. Looking closely, however, at the investments that actualized during the six-year term of the Aquino administration reveal that the increase in firm registration was slow, punctuated by a brief dip. The rate and speed of firm registration during the Duterte administration is staggering from a little over 500 registrations at the end of Aquino's to 1500 registrations just in the second year of Duterte—a three-fold increase in just two years.

Meanwhile, a comparison of firm registration from different countries, including China and the United States, is also telling. Figure 4 visibly suggests that US firm registration is relatively at the same level temporally punctuated by several dips during both the Aquino and Duterte administrations. This decline has seen firm registration for China, however, which shot up very significantly. Foreign direct investment is a way to spur economic growth and productivity, and regime legitimacy partly depends on the ability to produce economic wellbeing for populations. Countries thus compete for these investments by deliberately putting in place measures that would ease the entry of businesses in a country. Looking at FDIs in this way make the measurement of FDIs a good indicator of a country's position towards another country. Foreign investments, however, are also political in another sense by enabling the originating state control over the receiving state in some way. For Chinese investments, this control comes in the form of a "Sino-centric capital export regime" where Chinese state-backed capital is able to improve the "eligibility" of the receiving state to better manage inter-state disputes (Camba, 2020).

FIGURE 3 . ANNUAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED FIRMS WITH CHINESE FDI, 1990-2018



SOURCE: CAMBA AND MAGAT (2020 P. 12)

FIGURE 4 . ANNUAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED FIRMS WITH FDI FROM FOREIGN STATES, 1990-2018



SOURCE: CAMBA AND MAGAT (2020 P. 12)

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SECURITY POLICY AND ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT

It is well known that President Duterte shelved the arbitration case that the Philippines won just as he assumed the presidency. He also disallowed the Philippine Navy from doing joint patrols with the US Navy in the South China Sea and decided to expunge the US Special Operations Forces in Mindanao. Duterte also announced in 2016 that the Philippine–US Amphibious Landing Exercise (PHILBEX) would be the last during this term as president. While Duterte was determined to end all joint military exercises totally,, he would be warned by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to continue some of the exercises, which would ultimately result in the reduction of the exercises to thirteen from twenty-eight. Despite this "crisis in Philippine-US relations" during the early Duterte presidency, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) forged under the previous Aquino regime would continue, albeit hesitantly (De Castro, 2017). Meanwhile, the Philippines would continue to speak and engage with other countries, including Japan, for example, or the "quad." Japan and Australia, however, has ceased to become a regional power, so an analysis of Philippine-Japan relations vis-à-vis the Duterte's supposed hedging is not entirely useful.

Three recent developments have to be noted in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. First was the near abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Second is the renewed aggressiveness of China in the South China Sea during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Philippines' decision to limit naval patrols only within the 12 nautical miles of the Philippines. Third is the delay in the closing of Philippine borders in light of the COVID-19 pandemic to avoid anger from China. These developments are examples of clear or visible accommodation.

The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) forged in 1998 is a cornerstone of the United States' alliance with the Philippines, which may perhaps be the strongest in Asia. The VFA lays down the rules for the entry of equipment, weaponry, and ships and the rules for US military personnel in the Philippines. Under the VFA, the United States enjoys tax-free entry of military assets while its personnel enjoy lenient access to the Philippines. Also, the legal jurisdiction of American personnel is in the United States, with some exceptions. On the other hand, the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) enables a framework where if a foreign force attacks either country in the agreement, each has the responsibility to aid each other. These are complemented by the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), where the United States will be allowed to create military facilities in the Philippines. Nationalist and the threat of abuses have always been raised against these tripartite agreements with the United States, Duterte including. President Duterte threatened the abrogation of the VFA in February 2020 and the EDCA in 2017. However, Duterte affirmed the EDCA in a meeting with Trump, and the VFA abrogation was scrapped in June 2020. Meaning, the Philippines retains these agreements with the United States. While the VFA was not scrapped, the Philippines announced in August 2020 that it would not participate in the naval drills with the US beyond its 12 nautical miles as a deliberate and consistent attempt to not irk China.

China had increased aggression in the South China Sea to the extent of militarizing and building artificial islands and employing violent means against fisherfolk and naval or coast guard vessels and personnel of the other claimant states. From 2010 until June 2019, there were around 70 confrontations recorded in the South China Sea among ASEAN states, and between some ASEAN states and China. An overwhelming majority of the incidents were between ASEAN member states and China. The period between 2015 to 2016 recorded the highest number of incidents. Twenty-two of the seventy confrontations in the South China Sea involved the Philippines from 2010 to 2019. The highest number of confrontations involving the Philippines was in the year of 2016, involving seven incidents, mostly with China.[4]

On top of the systematic attempt to make China happy, the Philippines has mostly pursued a policy of diplomatic protests instead of calling on alliances such as the United States to help enforce the disputes despite the fact that China continues to encroach territory with overlapping claims with the Philippines. As such, the Philippines cannot be said to be hedging in this regard because there is a clear attempt to bet on China's possible economic gains against the country's territorial interests.

CONCLUSIONS

In pitting the literature on the balance of power politics vis-a-vis the Philippine record in navigating two great powers in the Southeast Asian region, this research illuminates on several things. First, the paper defined what a hedging policy may look like and what it is not. Here, the argument is to treat hedging as strategic ambiguity. This was then juxtaposed with the conditions to consider whether a country is pursuing a policy of accommodation.

Lastly, the paper tried to apply these notions to the empirical record of the Philippines under President Duterte, specifically considering three empirical dimensions: discursive, economic, and security alliance. Looking at the empirical record more closely, it is incorrect to argue that the Philippines is pursuing a strategically ambiguous policy. Instead, the Philippines has been obvious in both intentions and actions that it is accommodating China, instead of hedging, whether as a means of diversification or appeasement.

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ENDNOTES

[1] The author would like to thank Anzelwise Paras, a political economy graduate student at the University of Asia & the Pacific School of Law and Governance, for his assistance in carrying out this research.

[2] Haacke provides as well an excellent review not just the various ways in which hedging was used in the literature of Asian international relations, but also of which Southeast Asian states have been seen to be hedging or not.

[3] Goh (2006) also identifies containment and buckpassing strategies

[4] This data was compiled by the author from the Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) South China Sea Incidents Tracker. Accessed June 25, 2019: https://csis-ilab.github.io/cpower-viz/csis-china-sea/

[5] Cover page image credit: lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/duterte-china-policy-beyond-law

[6] Page 2 image credit: news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/22/20/dutertes-china-policy-is-opposite-of-appeasement-dfa

[7] Page 5 image credit: youtube.com/watch?v=Z0_DLnyM3s0

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