

RIZAL G. BUENDIA, PH.D



THE CONTINUING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATION-STATE BUILDING IN THE PHILIPPINES

stratbase



ADRI PUBLICATIONS

The Stratbase ADR Institute for Strategic and International Studies (ADRI) is an independent strategic research organization with the principal goal of addressing the issues affecting the Philippines and East Asia through:

1. Effecting national, regional, and international policy change or support
2. Fostering strategic ideas based on cooperation and innovative thinking
3. Providing a regional venue for collaboration and cooperation in dealing with critical issues in East Asia; and
4. Actively participating in regional debates and global conversations

With its international focus, ADRI believes that Philippine regional security and development can be achieved through the cooperation of the public and private sectors.

ADRI traces its roots to the Stratbase Research Institute (SRI) established in 2004. SRI focused on providing strategic solutions to domestic governance, socio-economic, and other policy concerns. It aimed to contribute to Philippine development through research and responsive policy alternatives.

As SRI sought solutions, East Asia's affairs frequently inserted themselves into the equation. There was and is a clear relation between domestic and regional affairs; movement in one reverberates in the other.

THE CONTINUING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATION-STATE BUILDING IN THE PHILIPPINES

WRITTEN BY
RIZAL G. BUENDIA, PH.D

stratbase  + **ADRI PUBLICATIONS**
Manila, Philippines

Stratbase ADRI

Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies

Copyright © 2020

A Publication of the Stratbase Albert Del Rosario Institute for
Strategic and International Studies

Stratbase ADRI Website: www.adrinstitute.org

Facebook: <https://facebook.com/stratbaseadri/>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/stratbaseadri/>

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of the Institute, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

The views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute or any of its officers and trustees.

The author is solely responsible for its content.

For information, address ADRI Publications:
9F 6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati City 1200

Design by Carol Manhit
Text set in 11 type Minion Pro

Printed in the Philippines by Rex Publishing
Manila, Philippines

ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION

Victor Andres “Dindo” C. Manhit is the President of Stratbase Albert Del Rosario Institute for Strategic and International Studies. Concurrently, he is Philippine Country Head of the renowned BowerGroupAsia (BGA). He was a former Chair and recently retired Associate Professor of the Political Science Department of De La Salle University. Among the government positions he held include Undersecretary for External Affairs and Special Concerns of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Deputy Secretary for Administration and Financial Services of the Philippine Senate. Meanwhile, his legislative experience encompasses the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 12th Congress as the Chief of Staff of the late Former Senate President Edgardo Angara and senior policy research adviser in key senate committees.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Ambassador Albert del Rosario was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines from 2011 to 2016. He also served as Philippine Ambassador to the United States of America from 2001 to 2006. Prior to entering public service, Amb. Del Rosario was on the Board of Directors of over 50 firms. He received numerous awards and recognition for his valuable contributions to the Philippines and abroad.

Manuel V. Pangilinan is CEO and managing director of First Pacific Company Limited. He is also the chairman of Metro Pacific Investments Corp., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Manila Electric Co. (Meralco), and Smart Communications, among others. He is a recipient of several prestigious awards including the Ten Outstanding Young Men of the Philippines (TOYM) Award for International Finance in 1983 and the Presidential Pamana ng Pilipino Award by the Office of the President of the Philippines in 1996.

Edgardo G. Lacson is an honorary chairman of the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI). He is the Chairman of the Employers Confederation of the Philippines. He holds numerous leadership positions in various companies. He served as a Director of The Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. and is an Honorary Member of the Rotary Club-Diliman.

Benjamin Philip G. Romualdez is the former president of the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines. He also holds, among others, the following positions: Chairman of MST Management, Inc., President of Oxford University and Cambridge University Club of the Philippines, Director at Philippine-Australia Business Council (PABC), Trustee/Vice President of Doña Remedios Trinidad Romualdez Medical Foundation, Inc, and Trustee/Vice President of Dr. Vicente Orestes Romualdez (DVOR) Educational Foundation, Inc.

Ernest Z. Bower is a senior adviser for Southeast Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), having founded the first chair for the region. He is CEO of BowerGroupAsia (BGA) and a leading expert on Southeast Asia.

Renato C. de Castro, Ph. D is a full professor of international studies at De La Salle University – Manila (DLSU). In 2009, Dr. de Castro became the U.S. State Department ASEAN Research Fellow from the Philippines and was based in the Political Science Department of Arizona State University. A consultant in the National Security Council of the Philippines during the Aquino administration, he has written over 80 articles on international relations and security.

Judge Raul C. Pangalangan, Ph. D is a judge of the International Criminal Court. He was previously the dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law and publisher of the Philippine Daily Inquirer. He has taught in many universities around the world, such as Melbourne University, Hong Kong University, and Harvard Law School.

Epictetus E. Patalinghug, Ph. D is a professor emeritus at the Cesar E.A. Virata School of Business, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman. He received his doctorate degree in Agricultural Economics from the University of Hawaii. His works have been featured in various publications around the world.

Francisco A. Magno, Ph. D is the executive director of the Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance and former President of the Philippine Political Science Association. He is a professor of political science at DLSU and previously served as Chair of the Political Science Department and Director of the Social Development Research Center.

Carlos Primo C. David, Ph. D. is a licensed geologist and professor in UP Diliman having obtained his PhD in Environmental Science and Geology from Stanford University. He is a former Executive Director of DOST-PCIEERD. A project leader of the DOST's Project NOAH, Dr. David pioneers short term rainfall forecasting in the country and climate change-related research on water resources.

CONTENTS

Introduction	1
The paper argues that the country's inability to transcend the challenges and requisites of political advancement are collectively rooted to the inchoate sense of nationhood and consciousness, traditional politicians' and dynastic control of the electoral system, and less participative governance	
Political Development: What Is It and Why	4
The divergences and variances on the concept and definition of political development are partly on account of inter-disciplinary focus and partly a manifestation of ethnocentric bases	
The Shaping of Philippine Political Development: Looking Back to See the Future	14
Philippine political development is inseparable from the growth and transformation of the country's political and social structures borne out of its colonial history – more than three centuries under Spain, almost five decades under the Americans, and few years under the Japanese	
Trends: Key Events and What Is In Store	35
As the Philippines' current political development has been defined by its political history, its future shall be formed in a manner that the nation-state stimulates national unity, democratic institutions are strengthened, and better governance	
Summary, Conclusion and Challenges	48
The demands for better governance that began in the country's popular uprising have yet to be fulfilled and its realization is contingent on the re-structuring of Philippine political institutions that would ensure that democratic space is enlarged through a more inclusive and participative governance, more representative electoral system, and deeper national consciousness	

ABSTRACT

A post-World War II concept, political development has defined the processes of democratization, people empowerment, governance, and nation-state building among former colonies which gained independence with the collapse of repressive empires. Ultimately, political development is demonstrated through an increased national political unity and vigorous political participation. Whatever form it may take, political development is a type of structural change. A change that is incremental or dialectical, producing development or regression (decay), besides periods of stagnation.

Seventy-five years after the United States recognized Philippine independence, the country continues to chart its political development not only as a self-governing entity but also a nation-state obliged to realize a more democratic society, empowered people, and better means to govern. The paper explores Philippines' political development and identifies the key factors that inhibit, and logically the issues that need to be addressed in achieving a more democratic and legitimate government, improving the system of governance, and strengthening and unifying the nation-state. It argues that the country's inability to transcend the challenges and requisites of political advancement are collectively rooted to the inchoate sense of nationhood and consciousness, traditional politicians' and dynastic control of the electoral system, and less participative governance.

Towards the end, a threefold challenge is presented: drawing a unified approach in bringing together various ethnic, religious, and national groups into the Philippine nation-state; combining political stability with political liberalization and democratization; and transforming political culture and actual political relationships to a more egalitarian, less hierarchical, and further symmetrical relationship between groups of political actors.

THE CONTINUING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATION-STATE BUILDING IN THE PHILIPPINES

RIZAL G. BUENDIA, PH.D

The country's political development remains enduring and challenging. It is tied with and reflected on the events that shaped its colonial past. While its present has been whittled by the history of the nation, its future will be defined by how state and society conduct its politics. Equally, the country's continuing endeavor to chisel out its national and political advancement is contingent and cannot be divorced from its quest for and vision of national identity and sense of nationhood. Towards this effort, the paper attempts to capture and examine the process of the country's political development within the purview of nation-state building.

The distinctiveness of Philippine political development is avouched by its peculiarity compared to other Southeast Asian countries – the first country to stage a national revolution against Western colonialism, in 1896; the only predominantly Christian nation with more than 86 percent of the population is Roman Catholic and 8 percent belongs to well over a hundred Protestant denominations and various nationalized Christian cults (Miller n.d.); colonized directly by two

Western powers – Spain for more than three centuries and the United States of America for five decades; and highly influenced by Western, specifically, American institutions, education, and culture.

The history of colonialism in the Philippines left an indelible impact on the nature, character, and dynamics of the country's socioeconomic and political system. To a great extent, this has defined the kind and level of development the country has attained (Buendia 1993). Seventy-four years after the Philippines has gained its independence from the US, the country has generally developed economically and socially, though not in a consistent manner, and has not experienced accelerated growth over the period of more than half-a-century of its nationhood.

Auspiciously in the last 14 years, the World Bank (WB) estimates that poverty rates in the country had declined from 26.6 percent in 2006 to 21.6 percent in 2015, and 16.6 percent in 2018 (WB 2018). Moreover, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) classifies the Philippines within the category of “High” in terms of Human Development Index (HDI)¹ in its 2019 Report (UNDP 2019). It ranked 5th among the 10 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states with an HDI of 0.712, Singapore as the highest at 0.935 and Cambodia rated the lowest (0.581). Between 1990 and 2018, Philippines' HDI value increased from 0.590 to 0.712, an increase of 20.6 percent.

The social transformation of the country involves societal and cultural change as a consequence of such factors like economic growth or political development and advancement. In particular, political development, whatever form it takes, is structural change; a change that is incremental or dialectical, producing development or regression (decay), besides periods of stagnation. When it happens in and to society, it is subject to the principle of congruence (Jaguaribe 1973, p.190).

Political development is a process of change where growth of institutional capability is manifested through a state's ability to channel rising participation across stable political parties, interest groups, or legislatures; capacity to formulate and implement socioeconomic development programs; and competency to defend national autonomy when it is threatened (Wurfel 1988, p. xi). This process takes place within a wider context of modernization but without necessarily sacrificing the ideals of democracy, social justice, and development.

Plainly, political development is a process of democratization whereby people are empowered either by society's institutions or sheer and conscious effort to empower themselves. Apart from the democratizing aspect, it involves the features of nation- and state-building. As such, the difficult but exciting process of progressively welding the people into a national community is carried out. Political institutions are indispensable instruments in state- and nation-building; they have to be employed to mobilize the active participation of the people in the political process and make them accessible to the masses to be their instrument in shaping their future social life.

Against the conceptual and theoretical backdrop of political development, the paper explores Philippines' political development, taking into account its historical context and explicates the key factors that contributed to the current dilemma in achieving substantial democratic rule, good governance, and strong and unified nation-state. Divided into three major parts, the paper lays down the fundamental building blocks of thoughts and beliefs as well as debates on "political development" and nexus between political development and nation-state building, analyses the process of shaping Philippine political development by focusing on the questions of nation-state building, the electoral system as the instrument of democracy and legitimacy of regimes, and praxis of governance as a mode of wielding

power, authority, and influence towards realizing a more democratic, relevant, and responsive political institutions capable of addressing the multifarious and multi-faceted needs and demands of both the state and society. Towards the end, the paper ties and wraps up the major issues that defines and constricts Philippine political development and the challenges that lie ahead.

The paper argues that the country's inability to transcend the challenges and requisites of political advancement are collectively rooted to the inchoate sense of nationhood and consciousness, traditional politicians' and dynastic control of the electoral system, and less participative governance. Unless structural, political, and electoral reforms leading to a more empowered government structure, democratized electoral system, and participative governance are consistently and unswervingly instituted, society would consequently steer towards political decay and insulate the nation-state from the people it serves.

Political Development: What Is It and Why

The study of political development has its roots in the 1950s when a large number of American political scientists were attempting to study the political dynamics of the newly emerging countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The end of the Second World War in 1945 put an end to all European colonial empires and brought the emergence of new nation-states from the ashes of colonial realms.

Five years after the conclusion of World War II the world witnessed the following: the rise of the Cold War between the US and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR); the spread of McCarthyism;² the upsurge of political and civil rights movements; the outbreak of the

Korean War (1950-1953); the acceleration of large-scale decolonization of former European and American colonial empires in Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos from France, Malaysia from the United Kingdom [UK], and the Philippines from the US), Africa (Algeria from France, Congo from Belgium, and Ghana from the UK) and Latin America (Cuba from pro-American President Fulgencio Batista), and victory of the anti-colonial and anti-feudal socialist revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party against the US-supported Kuomintang Party or Chinese Nationalist Party as well as the subsequent birth of the socialist Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and eventual socialist transition from 1953 to 1957.

The political instability and volatility of the period were also demonstrated by political events that saw internal conflicts and upheaval of people against their own government, presumably supported by the US's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to safeguard its geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the region and country against the USSR. Apparently, this is a manifestation of Cold War politics between two ideologically-driven superpowers. Unlike the USSR, the US has supported several coup d'états in the 1950s to secure its political and economic power in the following countries: Egypt in 1952; Iran in 1953; Guatemala in 1954; Syria in 1956-57; Indonesia in 1959; Lebanon in 1958; and Iraq in 1959.

Given this context, political thinkers, sociologists, and economists examined "political development" as a multi-dimensional concept and practice in Western and non-Western nation-states that were created in the aftermath of the War. One aspect of its multi-dimensionality is the process of unnecessarily isolating political development from other aspects coming under the total process of modernization, i.e. economic development, social development, cultural development, and human development.

The use of the term “political development” has evolved over the past seven decades hitherto hardly any unanimity among the scholars on the constituents of political development. The divergences and variances on the concept and definition of political development are partly on account of inter-disciplinary focus and partly a manifestation of ethnocentric bases. In spite of such differences, there are fundamental notional uniformity across countries, time, and space. In a succinct discussion, approaches and meanings of political development are dealt with below.

Brief Conceptual Exposition

Far from being exhaustive, this part of the paper explores the evolution of political development as a theory and conceptual framework. It attempts to contextualize the growth, ascertain the challenges, and pose enduring questions on the development and decay of politics confronting the less developed countries of humankind.

Markedly, as the world rebuilds itself from the ruins of World War II, scholars of comparative politics shifted their interest from Western Europe and North America to the Cold War against the USSR and the onto the American expansion policies and pursuits in underdeveloped and developing countries in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. Led by behaviouralist³ political scientists like Gabriel Almond, James S. Coleman and their associates, they adapted the concepts of structure, function, input, output, feedback and system from the leading contemporary schools of sociological analyses to appraise and compare the politics of different countries in their work, “The Politics of the Developing Areas,” published in 1960. The behaviouralist made a major contribution by introducing more precise and statistical

measurements of social and political development (Russet et.al. 1964).

A wide array of literature on political development were produced by scholars that examined post-war politics in former European and American colonies and territories. Huntington and Dominguez (1975, pp. 1-96) categorized the literature into three schools of thought and approaches. These are: (a) system-function approach; (b) social process approach; and (c) comparative history approach.

The system-function approach combined the elements of system theory and structure-functionalism approach. It explains why society functions the way it does by emphasizing the relationships between the various social structures and political institutions that make up society (e.g., government, law, education, religion, etc.) which are relatively stable patterns of social behaviour. The thought and approach are heavily influenced by the work of sociologist Talcott Parsons (1951, 1961, 1969, and 1971). Other scholars who subscribe and advocate the same belief include David Easton (1953, 1965a, 1965b), Leonard Binder (1962), Fred Riggs (1964), David Apter (1965, 1971), Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell (1966), and Gabriel Almond (1970).

The social process theory/approach relates political behaviour, actions, and interactions with various organizations, institutions, and processes in society brought about by industrialization, urbanisation and increasing media consumption. The approach and theory is promoted in the works of Lerner (1958), Karl Deutsch (1961), Phillips Cutright (1963), Hayward Alker (1966), Michel Hudson (1968), and Martin Needler (1968) among others.

The comparative history approach examines historical events in order to explain the political consequences of a particular incident, time, or place either by direct comparison to other historical events or reference to the current affair. Generally, it cuts across political history, economic history, and historical sociology. The approach

has been extensively used in the works of Cyril Black (1966), S. N. Eisenstadt (1966), Seymour Martin Lipset (1963), Barrington Moore (1966), Dankwart Rustow (1967), Reinhard Bendix (1964), Samuel P. Huntington (1968), and Lucian W. Pye (1966).

The vast study on political development gave rise to its multiple definitions that relate to the social, economic, and cultural dimensions of society. The concept implies that all the underdeveloped countries will have to follow the same path which the developed countries had passed through.

W. W. Rostow (1960, pp. 4-16) theorizes that “development” is transpired in five stages of economic growth as: traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive towards maturity and the age of high mass consumption. His later study, *Politics and the Stages of Growth*, Rostow (1971, pp. 230-266), includes another stage named as ‘the search for equality’. Appending Rostow, A. F. K. Organski (1965) demarcates four stages of political development, which are: the politics of primary unification; the politics of industrialization; the politics of national welfare; and the politics of abundance. These typological perspectives of political development assume that developing countries will have to follow and copy the Western model of political development.

The concept of “development” is made synonymous with modernization, thus political development is viewed and sometimes alternatively dubbed as political modernization (Lipset, 1959; Deutch, 1961; Apter 1965). In Shils’ (1970) study, he argues that modernization is coupled with the emergence of elite in new modernizing states. Though the elite class carries a narrow interest, serving their own benefit, elite paradoxically embody the ideals of democracy.

Robert Dahl (1971) identifies two principal routes in bringing

about democracy to developing and underdeveloped new states: one is through competition; and the other is by way of participation. Competition or liberalization concerns the extent to which rights and liberties are available to members of the political system. Increasing liberalization means enlarging the possibility for political opposition and competition for governmental power.

Riggs, on the other hand, states political development as the “process of politicization; increasing participation or involvement of the citizen in state activities, in power calculations and consequences” (Riggs 1970, p. 580). While Pye (1966) says that regardless of form of government, either democratic or totalitarian, there must be a façade popular rule for subjects so that they should become active citizens.

Park (1984, p. 58) ponders political development in terms of the “capacity of the political system to satisfy the changing needs of the members of the society.” He further postulates that institutions are to be faced with the respective tasks of “regime formation,” “political integration,” “resource expansion,” and “conflict management” (Park 1984, Ch 3). In this respect, political development includes an increasing of capacity of the political system to manage public affairs, administer and control conflicts, and cope with popular demands.

As Lucian Pye mentions in his earlier work, “political development is a basic concept supporting the gradual diffusion throughout all societies of what we might call a world culture.” (Pye 1963, p. 19). According to him, the first step to reach political development is the development of a national state. He points out, political development can be in the whole population, at the government level and in the organization of political system as well (Pye 1965).

In a general sense, Lucian Pye gives ten definitions of political development. These fundamentally refer to: (1) political prerequisites of economic development; (2) the politics typical of industrial society;

(3) political modernization; (4) the operation of a nation-state; (5) administrative and legal development; (6) mass mobilization and participation; (7) building of democracy; (8) stable and orderly change; (9) mobilization and power; and (10) one aspect of a multi-dimensional process of social change. (Pye 1966, pp. 33-45).

The Other Side

In the early 1960s, a wave of new theories emerged which questioned some of the assumptions of the earlier concepts and theories on political development. The most well-known work in the category is that of Samuel Huntington's (1965; 1968). Instead of democracy, Huntington focuses on order, arguing that steps be taken to moderate the impact of political involvement on the political structure. He identifies stability and institutional capacity as the crucial factors in the process of political development.

Huntington writes in the opening sentence of *Political Order in Changing Societies*, "... the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government" (Huntington 1968, p. 1). Institutionalism, he declares, is a prerequisite for political order, and political order usually comes before freedom – for without a degree of political and administrative order, freedom has little value. He further argues that order is a prerequisite for socioeconomic modernization and modernization is contingent on institutionalism; institutions therefore are more important than democracy and foundations of modernizing state.

Modernisation theory was similarly censured for making assumptions about the homogenous nature of culture and tradition, the supremacy and primacy of Western ideals and the possibility

of reproducing the Western experience (Smith 2003). Randall and Theobald (1985) opine that critiques of the modernization theories remain to operate “within the ambiance of the modernization theories”; they still used political development “as a goal and conceptual yardstick” and continue to retain “a kind of developmental optimism” in their analysis (p. 65). Harry Eckstein (1982) declares that the study of political development has come to a critical juncture and puts it that, “development theorists tried, in essence, to find patterns in pervasive novelty and seeming flux – to get bearings in a world devoid of all fixity and precedents” (p. 457).

There was a rediscovery of the concept of the state as a key to understanding the dynamics of politics. Somjee (1982, pp. 91-111) suggests the concept of political capacity. The study of political development, he writes, should be removed from the preoccupation with structures and systems. Instead, it should deal with the actual processes of development “in all their imbalances and misdirection.” Mehta (1978, p. 60) proposes an “integralist-pluralist” model, which requires “development of the whole society.”

Other revisionists made attempts to incorporate the indigenous social and cultural structures in the political development framework. Gusfield’s (1967) and Rudolph’s (1967) studies of India for example, demonstrate the fact that traditional societies are dynamic, far from being motionless and that traditional culture is far from being a consistent body of norms and values. Their works prove that tradition and modernity are neither in competition nor in conflict; innovation does not necessarily replace old traditions and the modernizing process will not always weaken tradition. Traditional beliefs, practices, and social structures are not simply superseded nor outmoded by modern forms rather they tend to be modified by new social and cultural movements. Such studies led to greater attention being paid

to the content and nature of traditional institutions and how they interact with changes.

Huntington (1987) notes that the studies are more concerned with theories of development rather than the realities of the developing countries. The era of introspection and retrospection has arrived for the study of political development, he declares that models “are less likely to come from the normative theorizing of intellectuals than from the historical experience of societies” (pp. 3-4).

Finally, Howard Wiarda (1991, pp. 36-39) summarizes the main criticisms as follows: since they were based on the Western experience, these theories were biased and ethnocentric; given today’s international context it was not possible to duplicate the timing, sequences, and stages of development as experienced by the West; the role of traditional institutions were not adequately understood; these theories created false hopes and unrealistic goals for the underdeveloped countries; they were part of the American Cold War strategy to keep the underdeveloped world suppressed; the proponents of these theories were in rivalry with each other for leadership of the political development movement.

Nation-state Building

In as much as the concept and study of political development commenced at the time that territorial boundaries of former colonial empires have been redefined, peoples’ deep sense of nationalism created national identity and subsequently crafted territorial boundaries of new nations. Ernest Gellner (1964; 1983) explains the advent of nations and nationalism are nationalist struggles of people and movements of modernity, envisioning a

“nation” that has been lost or in danger of losing it in the process of modernization.

The thesis of “imagined community” of Benedict Anderson follows a related frame of argument. Anderson (1983; rev. ed., 1991) asserts that modern nations are “imagined political communities.” They are products of discourse, constructed out of concrete social and historical processes. Society, therefore, is both a social structure and an artifact of imagination. He suggests that rather than thinking of the distinctiveness of nations as something fabricated, they should be understood in terms of styles they are imagined and manner institutions are made possible.

Anderson traces the roots of nationalism to the search of people to redeem their concept of “national unity,” “power,” and “territories” which have been lost to antiquity. These concepts have regained their meaning with the rise of capitalism, technology of communication, and fatality of human linguistic diversity. The interplay between capitalism, technology, and fatality made it possible for people to conceive new communities, as they are able to think about themselves and to relate to others in profoundly new ways.

Overall, nationalism is rooted in modernity. Modernization is a multilateral process that involves changes in all areas of human ideas and activity. Its aspects, such as industrialization, secularization, democratization, education and literacy, urbanization, social mobilization, and mass media participation are related and closely associated either as independent factors or may be historically linked in nation-building. Clearly, nationalism plays a crucial role to the process of political development. And in all countries, common political aspiration is one of the factors essential for the development of nationalism. The case of the Philippines is no different from the rest.

The Shaping of Philippine Political Development: Looking Back to See the Future

Philippine political development is inseparable from the growth and transformation of the country's political and social structures borne out of its colonial history – more than three centuries under Spain, almost five decades under the Americans, and few years under the Japanese.⁴ Philippine history is virtually a history of the colonized peoples while the history of the uncolonized peoples was lightly or never written of at all or simply articulated in their oral traditions, myths, folklores and legends.

The dichotomy of the Philippine political history – one, of the conquered, subjugated, Christianized, and acculturated Filipinos and two, of the unconquered and uncolonized exemplified by the Muslims and other major ethnic groups like the Cordillerans⁵ of northern Luzon – explains the division of the country between the majority and minority peoples. It was this distinctiveness in their historical creation which fashioned the emergence of separate Filipino identities and consciousness identifiable only in their respective sense of communal solidarity and sentiment and defined in accordance with the languages and sympathies of the population.

The advent of Spanish colonial rule in the 16th century aborted the natural or indigenous development of the country and reversed the historic trend. Two centuries prior to colonialism, Sultanates (integrated datuships and rajahships) have already been established in the southern part of the Philippines, specifically in Maguindanao and the Sulu and Tawi-tawi archipelagos. The religious-political suzerainty or “suprakinship unit of the state” served as the foundation of Sultanates’ political system that somehow thwarted Spanish expansionism. Historians assessed that Islam provided the political means to challenge

colonial rule. (Phelan 1959, p. 143; Jocano 1975, p. 158; Gowing and McAmis 1979, p. 14; Tan 1993, p. 7). It is premised that had the Spaniards not arrived, a Muslim nation would have emerged in the country and thoroughly exposed to the great Asian traditions.

While non-Muslim natives were fragmented (living in small socioeconomic and political unit), easily subjugated, proselytized to Christianity, and created in the “image and likeness” of their colonizers, Muslims and indigenous mountain tribes were able to form their own national consciousness and identity out of their common struggle as a separate people. The costly wars stirred up by the Spaniards between the Christianized Filipinos and Muslims shaped the Philippine political destiny. From hindsight, it is hypothesized that had the Spaniards allowed the diverse people of different religious beliefs (Christians, Muslims, and non-Christian and non-Muslims) accepted each other and coexisted in peace, a fraternal union of two or more independent nation-states would have probably emerged in the archipelago rather than one republic today (Corpuz 1989, p. x).

Conceivably, the concept of a “one-nation, one-state” is a creation of the colonizers to bolster colonial rule and institutionalize a unitary state for more effective governance and easier implementation of policies in the whole archipelago. This system of unitary governance superimposes unity and homogeneity in the entirety of the country despite the diversities and heterogeneities among the populace.

Colonialism, Nationalism, Nation-state Building, and the Unitary State

The highly centralized unitary structure of government imposed by a series of colonial regimes was undoubtedly an instrument of national

subjugation serving the economic, political, and cultural interests of colonial masters. Although the unitary system has been a valuable political mechanism in controlling the hearts and minds of people and in suppressing resistance movements, it failed to break the backbone of the indigenous socio-political systems of the Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation),⁶ Cordillerans, and other non-colonized people now called the “national” or “cultural minorities.” In effect, the Republic hitherto has not really experienced one history nor has its people lived under one nation with one set of socio-economic and political system.

For democracy to be tangible, the minorities must be given the opportunity to run their own political affairs, have control over their resources and own development, and cease to be treated as second-class citizens. The prescription of any “obligatory” policy that would work towards homogenization and oneness where there is stark socio-politico-cultural and economic heterogeneity and diversity is an ultimate threat not only to distinct communities but to political stability, unity, and peace.

Building a nation-state in a multi-ethnic society through the centralized power of the state will simply result in internecine conflicts as evinced by the Bangsamoro and Cordilleran armed engagements with the state in the 1960s. The effort to “melt” the indissoluble ethnic and cultural identities and deny the minority peoples their right to self-governance may challenge not only the legitimacy of the state but also the nature of a representative government by peoples who historically resisted foreign and domestic colonialism. Nation-state building, thus, requires the empowerment of diverse ethnic communities and recognition of their right to self-determination as defined by their cultural, ethnic, and religious identities rather than solely by the undue power and entitlement of the majority peoples.

Although direct American colonial rule in the Philippines is much

shorter, lasting only for 46 years with a brief interregnum of Japanese occupation in 1942, than centuries of Spanish rule, the impact of its domination on Filipinos' identity and consciousness, governing structures and institutions, and country's political development cannot be overstated.

The tenuous identity and shallow appreciation of Filipinos' sense of nationhood is borne out of US deliberate policy in the early years of its colonial governance to de-emphasize politics and veer the population away from anti-colonial resistance movement on the one hand, and attract them to America's "benevolent assimilation" policy⁷ on the other hand. The US underscored the role of education in political development on the belief that if powers of government were to be transferred to the Filipinos in the future, education would be essential to public administration and sensible management of the government. For these reasons, the Americans made it a colonial policy to establish, maintain and expand the public school system from the primary to tertiary level.

Consequently, the US control over the country's educational policy for nearly half-a-century (1898-1946) impressed a foreign social behaviour and norm upon the Filipinos' mind. Through the institution of a nationwide public-school system and the use of English as a medium of instruction, Filipinos not only began learning a new language but a new culture which advanced the process of Americanizing the Filipino consciousness. Education became mis-education because it de-Filipinized the youth.

American culture, values, lifestyles, and standards were regarded as superior compared to its Filipino counterparts. American institutions and heroes were glorified, and promoted the American society as the model par excellence for Philippine society (Constantino 1974, p. 39; 1970, pp. 20-36). Moreover, competence in English became the basis for opportunities for employment and promotion in government and

in private firms. Civil service examinations were conducted only in English. The English language opened the door to cultural penetration and facilitated the transformation of the Filipino into consumer of American goods and proselytizer for the new consciousness.

The deeply ingrained colonial mentality that regards anything foreign, especially American, as necessarily superior has developed political servility of the country – the docility that characterized Filipino nationalism in the early years of independence, at least in comparison with nationalism in most post-colonial Southeast Asia. The neo-colonial character of Philippine politics has been manifested in major economic and trade policies designed and formulated by the government which sacrificed the interest of the nation and promoted the interest of western-capitalist system. (Abueva 1988; Schirmer and Shalom 1987; Buendia 1993).

In addition, the Americans brought with them their concept of liberal democracy which was understood and taken within the colonial framework rather than in the context of an independent and democratic nation-state. Abueva (1988, p. 47) highlights this flaw in the following passage:

An evident lesson of Filipino democracy under American guidance and thereafter is that no one but the Filipinos themselves, if they really wanted to, could develop a political and economic system that would enable the people at large to participate in, influence, and benefit from the processes of decision-making affecting them all. Democracy requires the freedom and the ability of its citizens to participate in ways that count, and on the patriotism, vision, and selfless service of its leaders. The Filipino leaders, along with the American governors, were responsible for much of the nation's problems (italics supplied).

Correspondingly, the Americans instituted political participation as the key process in training Filipinos towards self-governance. In

spite of the trappings of civil and political institutions introduced by the colonizers, Filipino values and characteristics of familism, personalism, and parochialism persisted and failed to develop among the people the concept of social well-being or national welfare (Abueva 1971, pp. 1-24). Even if democratic institutions taught civil and political rights, the ideals of nationalism, patriotism, and social justice were either repressed or insubstantially inculcated in peoples' consciousness and temperaments, especially among the country's leaders.

Lande (1991, p. 71) aptly describes that institutions overlaid by developed countries to developing ones suffer from institutional inadequacies and incapacities to perform their roles in the latter due to mismatch in the politico-economic and cultural systems and structures between the two countries concerned. This disparity is portrayed in the following words:

It is a fact of history that most developing countries are also new countries. They have young, untried institutions and administrative structures that fall far short of the task implicit in their ambitions for power and wealth. In many instances, they still have no firm identity, no sense of national purpose, no common interest. On the contrary, they suffer the pains and after-effects of colonial arrangements imposed without regard to reason or circumstances. Government is unstable or, even if enduring, essentially brittle. The regime may call itself democratic, but the people are subjects rather than citizens. As a result, whatever the economic gap that already separates many of these countries from the rich states, it is even bigger for the want of direction (in both senses) of the would-be followers (italics supplied).

Political institutions designed to sculpt Philippine statehood, i.e., notion of territorial jurisdiction, centralized government, system of governance, and political relationship between majority and minority peoples, have been largely defined by centuries of colonial rule. Since the post-colonial years, the Philippine unitary state has worked towards the integration, assimilation, and transformation of

multiple ethnic identities into a single national identity – a downward exertion of state nationalism. A nationalism undertaken through the assimilation and integration of minorities into the majority's culture, system of governance, and socio-economic structure.

While state has, for a time, forged national unity, some of its initiatives have triggered political and social conflict and rebellion. State reform measures do not necessarily empower groups and peoples who are ethnically, culturally, and religiously different but co-opt them into collaboration within the state power system itself. These actions undermined the process of nation-building. The state's nation-building project has been historically directed not towards the empowerment of regions or any administrative division of the country but headed for the fortification of centralism.

Conferring a semi-sovereign status to regions or any geographic area inhabited principally by people who are ethnically, culturally, and religiously distinct could be an option that the state can work on to further the nation-state building. However, this does not necessarily guarantee self-governance especially if power is exercised by traditional politicians. This issue will be dealt with in this paper.

Electoral System, Legitimacy, and Democratization

One of the key political institutions introduced by the Americans was the electoral system, institutionalized in 1899. Patterned after the Australian secret ballot system, with some modifications, the Americans brought in the right of popular suffrage at the municipal, provincial, and national levels of government. The secret ballot system intends to ensure the confidentiality of vote and sanctity of the ballot and discourage undue coercion, bribery, and other crimes that may

be committed by candidates against the voters before and during elections.

However, the imposition of an alien system of voting in a predominantly feudal and agrarian society⁸ where tenancy dependency (in spite of several land reform programs) on landlords is the main feature, thus patron-client relationship prevails. In this relationship, the landlord is considered the patron while the tenant is the client. The former dispenses favours and the latter reciprocates it by providing services and bestowing loyalty. This interaction simulates a kinship dimension with paternalistic landlord acting as the father and the tenants as his children. (Lande 1966; Villacorta 1990, p. 44).

This relationship persists and extends during elections. Politicians act both as good and bad patron at the same time, depending on the circumstances. While on the one hand a candidate distributes goods, services (infrastructure, health and medical, and welfare), and cash (especially on the eve of election day), on the other hand, he or she may turned violent – threatening and terrorizing both electorates and the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC)⁹ deputized registrars and inspectors (usually public-school teachers) and harassing their opponents and supporters. Election-related harassment and violence can range from intimidating and threatening persons with bodily harm, to kidnapping and murder. It also includes arson and bombings of strategic locations. Hired goons, private armies, the police and military, as well as armed rebel groups, also figure prominently (Patino and Velasco n.d.).

As a client, the electorate seeks material goods from the patron in exchange for his or her vote. This type of “utilitarian” culture perseveres and permeates both in rural and urban areas as well as local and national elections. Clients take advantage of elections by selling their votes to the highest bidder; civic organizations use the opportunity to

ask for donations from politicians; small enterprises make windfall profits through contracts with individual candidates for their campaign gimmicks like t-shirts, calendars, balloons, pencils, and basketballs with their names emblazoned on it; and businesspersons support candidates whom they believe have the high probability of winning, rather than based on principles, in exchange for contracts and favours beneficial to their businesses.

Beyond issues and platforms of government, a politician campaigning at election promises electorates government jobs, financial assistance, educational support and other personal aids. In turn, the voter supports the politician as a person – approachable, generous, and kind – or possesses transactional leadership, i.e., ability to produce tangible and material benefits (positive transaction) or capability to inflict harm or punishment to those perceived to be their “enemies” or “exploiters.” In both instances, the medium of exchange is “private goods.” Notwithstanding the endurance of political parties since the beginning of the century, people’s vote for the individual generates intense emotion and violence compared with voting for a party that pledges “public goods.” This psychological make-up of Filipino electorates is rooted on a culture of patron-clientelism that is largely attributed to the socio-economic under- and mal-development.

The overt use of the so-called “guns, goons, and gold,” usually referred to as the 3Gs of Philippine politics, coined by media to depict the violence and vote-buying which has characterized political campaign of the 1969 Presidential election in the country,¹⁰ has been the traditional fixture in Philippine electoral politics (Parsa 2000; Patino and Velasco n.d.). Likewise, cheating is a well-developed art in Philippine elections. Local politicians are adept at manipulating the process from beginning to end.

Cheating begins during the registration process when politicians

work to remove supporters of competitors and pad the voters list with “flying voters” (those who vote more than once in several precincts). Cheating does not end at the time of the actual election. Election return canvassers, often public-school teachers are bribed to manipulate the results. If cheating before and during the election is “retail” cheating, at the canvassing stage it is “wholesale” cheating that occurs. If cheating is a normal part of elections, so is protesting election results. Politicians say that no one losses in elections, only cheated.

Although several endeavors to reform and modernize Philippine electoral system have been done, hence laudable, it has to be accomplished in conjunction with the alteration of the current social, economic, and political iniquities. Unless this is resolved, modernization will simply serve the limited interest of the élite and powerful over the greater interest of the people and nation. Tangcangco’s (1997) study of the country’s modernization program reveals that electoral reforms will not eliminate fraud where unequal power between government and society exists. Thus, she concludes that the modernization of Philippine electoral system conforms with the “purposes of politicians, election officials, and interest groups to retain defective procedures and loopholes in election laws ... rather than of nagging concern for fairness and commitment to democracy by the incumbents.” (Tangcangco 1997, p. 127).

Elections have not become, as yet, an effective means of expressing people’s sovereignty in choosing their political leaders. While democracy is inconceivable without elections, elections alone are no guarantee for democratic rule. Put differently, one cannot be a democrat without supporting elections, but one can very well conduct elections without being a democrat.

Fareed Zakaria (2003, p. 102) enumerates a long list of what he referred to as “elected autocrats. He writes that, “Over the past decade,

elected governments claiming to represent the people have steadily encroached on the powers and the rights of other elements of society.” Zakaria draws a clear line between liberal democracy and the illiberal deviation which he calls “illiberal democracy.” In other words, while liberal democracy is characterized by competitive elections, the rule of law, the separation of powers and the protection of basic political liberties, “illiberal democracy” may permit competitive elections, but shows little respect for the aforementioned basic liberal rights.

Elections need not necessarily transpire in a democratic regime. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes do conduct elections as a measurement of legitimacy. Its purpose, meaning, and significance, however, are not to exercise people’s sovereignty over leaders, review current leadership’s performance, or renew people’s consent. Elections are done to appease and abate people’s resistance to the regime. Furthermore, they are intended to provide a peaceful option to radical, armed, and mass movements seeking to overthrow a despotic regime.

Although electorates are given the freedom to choose leaders under an authoritarian regime, their choices are limited to those who either support the regime or register token resistance to the regime. And the people who decide to participate in such election are obliged to abide by its results, thus, facilitating the legitimization of an undemocratic order. Evidently, electoral process becomes a means to legitimize the existing political affairs.

Under the Marcos’ 14-year authoritarian rule (1972-1986), for instance, four national elections¹¹ were held apart from another four plebiscites and referenda.¹² In all these political exercises, Marcos was able to legitimize his rule beyond the provision of the 1935 Constitution that pertains to the maximum term of office of the President.¹³ Clearly, elections, referenda, and plebiscites are

forms of political exercise that can be effectively or shrewdly used to lend legitimacy to a regime, even, a dictatorial one. Nevertheless, the minimal support of the people on such kind of regime makes legitimacy fragile. The People's Revolution of February 1986 and January 2001 prove that legitimacy has to enjoy people's mandate.

Local clans and dynasties including warlords and regional kingpins have played an important part in Philippine electoral politics. The support of local clans for a particular politician running in an election is indispensable in trying to convert mass popularity to actual votes (Brillantes 1990; Lande 1966; Villacorta 1990). Given the size of Filipino families and matrix of interrelationships that bind them, they ensure not only the political continuity and dominance of a particular clan in local politics but also play a major role in supporting the ascendancy, continuity, along with downfall of local political leaders as well as Philippine presidents. This is where the part machinery and local dynasties in particular come in, operating within the context of patronage.

The 1992 national elections exemplified the return of the pre-martial law contests among the landlords, compradors, oligarchs, and traditional elites. Of the 199 Congresspersons elected in May 1992, 132 had interest in land and agriculture, 17 in logging and 14 in mining; 145 were members of traditional political families or clans (Gutierrez 1994, pp. 4-5).

In as much as elections are necessary as yardsticks of leaders' legitimacy, they are not sufficient devices to test the strength of democracy. Elections have to be accompanied by functioning institutions and processes such as transparency, a free press (including unfettered investigative journalism), ombudspersons, participation, civil liberties, democratic political culture, and professional associations.

Governance, Civil Society Participation, and Corruption in Public Institutions

In the most common current usage of the term, “governance” or fittingly, “good governance” in international development literature, is seen as implying a move away from the usual government approach (a top-down approach which attempts to regulate the behavior of people and institutions in quite detailed and compartmentalized ways) to processes in governing (which tries to set the parameters of the system within which people and institutions behave so that self-regulation achieves the desired outcomes). Simply, “governance” is the replacement of traditional “powers over” with contextual “powers to” (Pierre and Peters, 2000).

The World Bank (WB) defines governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development. (WB 1991, p. 1); Worldwide Governance Indicators, a WB project, refers to it as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised (WB 2007); while Bell (2002) sees it as the use of institutions, structures of authority and collaboration to allocate finite resources (natural, human, financial, technological, and managerial), and coordinate or control activities in society or the economy.


Given the various definitions, the paper adopts the following as conceived by the Institute on Governance’s (IOG):

Good governance as the process whereby societies or organizations make their important decisions, determine who has voice, who is engaged in the process and how account is rendered... it exists where those in positions of power are perceived to have acquired their power legitimately, and there is appropriate voice accorded to those whose interests are affected by decisions. Further, the exercise of power results in a sense of overall direction that serves as a guide to action. ... governance should result in performance

that is responsive to the interests of citizens or stakeholders; it demands accountability between those in positions of power and those whose interests they are to serve. [There must be] transparency and openness in the conduct of the work being done. And, finally, governance should be fair, which implies conformity to the rule of law and the principle of equity (Edgar, et. al. 2006, pp. 1-2).

Figure 1 graphically depicts the interlocking relationship between and among the key actors in governance – government, civil society

Figure 1 . Interplay of Key Actors in Governance within the Socio-Economic, Cultural and Political Context



Source: Edgar, L. et. al. (2006). IOG, p. 3

(including the voluntary or not-for-profit sector), private sector, and media. The latter although not part of or controlled by the state, is a passionate actor which plays a key role by providing the flow of information between the major actors. There are no lucid boundaries between these players (in fact they overlap) as the sectors are permeable (e.g., state-owned/controlled organizations may bestride in both government and the private sector; government-funded civil society organizations [CSOs] also straddle two camps). The diagram also demonstrates the different players or actors that occupy the social and economic landscape within the context of the traditions, values and history that characterize that society.

Good governance protects political, civil, and cultural rights and ensures a competent and non-corrupt and accountable public administration. The government's ability to govern is gauged not simply on its capacity to pursue and realize development goals but more importantly on its capability to create the necessary social, political, economic, and cultural conditions where continuous processes of interaction between social actors, groups, and forces on the one hand, and public or semi-public organizations, formal institutions of government and authorities on the other hand, is allowed and guaranteed in co-managing and co-steering national development objectives.

Incisively, interactive governance does not only broaden institutional pluralism but also strengthen the centrifugal forces of social pluralism. It maintains a constant balancing process between the governing needs or problem situations as well as grasp of opportunities on one hand and governing capacities or mechanisms for problem-solving or strategy formulation on the other hand. In as much as no single actor, whether private or public, has the monopoly of knowledge and information required to solve complex, dynamic, and diversified

problems nor a single actor exists who has sufficient overview to apply effective solutions to problems, it becomes imperative that state's and society's responsibilities be fused at the central level and at the same time diffused at the local level.

Through this effort the domain primarily of the state and civil society is made permeable. And the borderline between the state and non-state responsibilities becomes the object of interaction. Strengthening the participation and voice of people, through enhanced civic engagement with the state, can improve accountability and trust in institutions while ensuring responsive decision-making across governing political, economic, and social institutions. In a nutshell, empowering people and ensuring inclusiveness and equality is critical to realizing good governance, strengthening regime's legitimacy, and sustaining development.

In terms of enjoining civil society as partner in governance, the 1987 Constitution has laid its framework. The strategic role of civil society, specifically non-governmental/peoples' organizations (NGOs/POs),¹⁴ in governance has been etched in Articles 2 and 13, Sections 23 and 15-16 respectively.

Between 1989 and 1992, the conducive political and institutional environment resulting from an enlarged democratic space after the downfall of Marcos regime led to the geometric increase of NGOs and POs. Aside from the disintegration of Marcos rule in 1986, the upsurge of CSOs was attributed to the following: (1) accessibility of NGOs/POs to government funding for socio-development projects through "pork barrel" (patronage-based) programmes; (2) increase of official (overseas) development assistance (ODA) through soft-loans and grants that requires NGO/PO involvement for development programs and projects; and (3) initiatives from government and/or its officials (both national and local) to take advantage of government and ODA

funds as well as to avail of tax shelters¹⁵ (Clarke 1998, p. 71).

Likewise, the promulgation of the Local Government Code (LGC) in 1991, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 7160, institutionalized the participation of NGOs/POs in the governance of local affairs. Numerous provisions strewn out in the Code (too many to cite) have mandated the participation of NGOs/POs in planning and monitoring local government projects through “Local Special Bodies.” Equally, they can enter into an active partnership with Local Government Units (LGUs) in development work in terms of: a) local governance; b) joint undertakings; c) preferential treatment for cooperatives and marginalized sectors; d) assistance for economic, socially-oriented, environmental, or cultural projects; and e) people empowerment and strengthening accountability (Villarin 1996).

In spite of constitutional guarantees and lawful assurances in establishing and consolidating state and civil society collaboration in governance, the patronage character of Philippine politics has undermined and weakened it. The élite-based political parties and traditional politicians who came back since the 1987 election and thereafter had debilitated the prospect of CSOs in governance.

The conflict between the forces of state and CSOs emerged as early as January 1987 when the national peasant-based organization, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasants’ Movement of the Philippines) staged a demonstration against the state’s backtracking on its commitment to implement a comprehensive agrarian reform. The protesters marched towards the presidential palace but were met not by government negotiators but by bullets from the security forces. The violent dispersal of demonstrators led to the death of 18 protesters and injured 74 others (51 demonstrators and 23 state security forces) – a situation reminiscent of the Marcos years. The incident was called the “Mendiola massacre.” The class suit filed by the relatives of the

demonstrators who died in the massacre was unfortunately dismissed by the Supreme Court in 1993 (Supreme Court G. R. No. 84607).

NGOs/POs continue to suffer from state's repression despite of government's pronouncements to accommodate them in joint development undertakings. From 1988 to 1989, Amnesty International estimated that 200 NGO/PO workers who were lawfully engaged in community development were victims of extra-judicial killings. (AI 1990, pp. 3 and 5). The relationship between the government and NGOs/POs was further strained when the former used some community-based organizations to support counter-insurgency campaigns in late 1980s until early 1990s. This was done through the National Reconciliation and Development Program (NRDP) and Rebel Returnee Livelihood Assistance Financing Program (RRLAFP) whereby NGOs were used as conduits of funds for rebel returnees. The tactic of employing NGOs/POs in counter-insurgency programs labeled as "development-oriented" drove the wedge deeper between "second-generation" and "third-generation" NGOs/POs.¹⁶ Hence, undermining the solidarity even among NGOs and POs – a case of dividing, weakening, and co-opting of CSOs by the state.

Additionally, state-NGOs/POs collaboration is threatened by political leaders' endeavors to set up mass-based organizations that serve as their political machinery or otherwise known as GRINGOs (government-initiated NGOs). In 1990, during the presidency of Corazon Aquino, the elite-dominated Congress (Senate and the House of Representatives [HoR]) established the Countryside Development Fund (CDF) – a new consolidated "pork barrel" programme – that allowed its members to channel development funds in their respective constituent areas through their own or "favorite" NGOs/POs either as a reward for electoral support or simply a conduit for their personal fund (Capino 1996 cf. Clarke 1998, p. 80). Although CDF is controlled

and managed by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), politicians have a significant influence over their spending priorities. Each member of the House and Senate has an allocation and in control of PhP 12.5 million and PhP 18 million respectively or an aggregate amount of PhP 2.9 billion (US\$ 105 million) in 1996.

During the presidency of Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), DBM's Secretary, Salvador Enriquez, confirmed that 45 percent of CDF funneled through NGOs/POs funds were not utilized in the delivery of public services or provision of public goods but used privately (Parreno 1998). The proliferation of élite, patronage-based, and business-oriented NGOs/POs (BONGOS) was enthused by the creation of CDF that became one of the sources of corruption. Enriquez acknowledged in an interview with *Asiaweek* in 1997 that under the Ramos administration, the country has an annual loss of approximately 10 percent of the gross national product or 20 to 30 percent of the government's budget to graft and corruption, thus substantially eroding whatever gains the economy has achieved (*Asiaweek* 1997, cf Gonzalez & Buendia 2003).

Undoubtedly, CDF is a patronage fund dangled by the administration's party to the members of the legislature to facilitate the passage of the executive's legislative agenda. It is not surprising that members of the legislative body readily join the administration's party right after assuming their posts as it is difficult for them to forego the benefits of CDF. The use of CDF by Philippine presidents as a political leverage to consolidate the power of the state remains as a serious problem in forging a strategic alliance between the state and NGOs/POs.

In 2000, the CDF was renamed Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under Joseph Estrada's presidency. From 2008, every member of the HoR usually receives an annual PDAF allocation of

PhP 70 million, while every senator receives PhP 200 million. The President also benefits from a PDAF-like allocation, the President's Social Fund (PSF), worth around PhP 1 billion. Given the 304 and 24 members of the HoR and the Senate respectively, Congress has control of cumulatively over PhP 26 billion of discretionary funds.

The amount of taxpayers' money at the disposal of the HoR's and Senate members have historically attracted corruption through misuse and mismanagement of public finance. The PDAF has been widely known as a source of "grand corruption." In 2013, a PhP10-billion scam was exposed regarding the misappropriation of PDAF which involved over 100 HoR members, 2 cabinet members, and more than 20 sitting and former members of the Senate (Carvajal 2013).

The scam runs for 13 years (2000 to 2013) covering three (3) presidents – Estrada, Arroyo, and Aquino III). Reports from the Commission on Audit (COA) and investigations of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) show that a highly-influential individual (Janet Napoles) connived with members Congress, Cabinet members, and local government officials to siphon out PDAF to non-existing NGOs and disbursed funds to "ghost projects" and allocate spoils (people's money) based on agreed sharing arrangement (GMA 2013; Javellana 2013).

Corruption leads to the favoring of inefficient producers, the unfair and inequitable distribution of scarce public resources and the leakage of reserve from the government coffer to private hands. Conceivably, corruption causes loss of confidence in government. Even the anti-graft court, the Sandiganbayan (Peoples' Foundation), and its investigating arm, the Office of Ombudsman, created under the 1987 Constitution mandated to prosecute and investigate respectively public officials charged with graft and corruption, have been tainted with corruption (Rocamora 1998).

In the bureaucracy, the system of merit as an embodiment of the “culture of competence, merit, and commitment to public service” has been atrophied by political patronage. It prolongs the effort of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to professionalize civil service. Employees in the civil service have accepted the reality that the lack of required educational qualifications and paucity of training are not impediments to enter government service. The adage, “it is not what you know but whom you know,” to get employed in government has been traditionally accepted.

Despite the technological inputs to management processes, often resulting in more controls imposed on and by the bureaucratic system, patronage continues to flourish. Patronage de-motivates when it is utilized in the recruitment of public personnel. It becomes worse when it becomes the deciding factor in cases of promotion in as much as civil service personnel look at promotion as an important aspect in career advancement in government. More often than not, political interference is the major and critical single factor identified as interfering with promotion, hence, career progression.

The common practice of political intervention is abetted by the regularity of changes in the political leadership. This means that after each election, political debts have to be paid. (Buendia 1993; Rivera 1994) Given the principles of political neutrality and security of tenure, the bureaucracy in due time will be dominated by misfits and undesirables.

The issue of good governance persists to be a vital question in the Philippines. The state’s inability to pursue the policy and practice of inclusiveness in governance through deep and expansive engagement with civil society, and accomplish public functions in a transparent and accountable manner will endure to obstruct its political development unless serious and consistent structural changes are established in government’s institutions.

Trends: Key Events and What Is In Store

Thirty-four years following the downfall of Marcos' authoritarian rule and after the successive rule of five presidents, the country remains in the process of determining the future of its political development. As the Philippines' current political development has been defined by its political history, its future shall be formed in a manner that the nation-state stimulates national unity, democratic institutions are strengthened, and better governance is realized and able to fulfill peoples' socio-economic and politico-cultural aspirations and interests.

Quest Towards Unification and Integration

In terms of national integration, a key concern in Philippine political development, the country has taken a significant step in preventing one of the major armed Muslim groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),¹⁷ from taking parts of Mindanao and Sulu archipelago out of the Philippines through a secessionist war. It took almost half-a-century of war and on-and-off peace talks, seven Presidents of the 4th and 5th Republics, and under four Constitutions (1935, 1973, 1986 [Freedom or Transitional], and 1987) before the MILF was finally brought back to the fold of the law and allowed to govern what Muslims consider as their homeland in Mindanao and Sulu under the supervision of the central government.

The ratification of Republic Act (RA) No. 11054, otherwise known as the "Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (OLBARM) or simply the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL)¹⁸ in the 21 January and 6 February 2019 plebiscites

signifies the cessation of armed conflict between the MILF and armed forces of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). The overwhelming endorsement of the BOL through the aforesaid plebiscites (88.57 percent of registered voters approved the BOL) (Cruz 2019) did not only rename the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)¹⁹ to Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) but also expanded its territorial coverage. Apart from the five provinces (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-tawi and Basilan) and a city (Marawi) which were under ARMM's politico-administrative jurisdiction, two more cities (Lamitan and Cotabato) and 63 villages of North Cotabato were added. Hence, the MILF-led BARMM has now the opportunity to govern an expansive area – 5 provinces, 3 cities, and 63 villages of North Cotabato – under the BOL.

In the transition phase, as provided in the BOL (Article 16), the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) shall govern the BARMM for three years until the members of the regional parliamentary government are elected in May 2022. Ensuring the success of the BARMM under the unitary state is most desirable not only by the national government but more critically by the new leaders of BARMM. Building a region ravaged by war and poverty for almost half-a-century is daunting. Regional as well as national leaders have yet to deal with a number of policy issues – resolving Bangsamoro national unity, increasing the capacity to govern, disarming and demobilizing armed groups, and addressing widespread corruption – and surmount the historical social injustice, cultural discrimination, economic deprivation, and political powerlessness of the people (Buendia 2019).

It should be noted nevertheless that the creation of an autonomous region is not solely intended for Muslim Mindanao.

The 1987 Constitution allows the creation of two autonomous regions – Cordillera and Mindanao (Article 10, sections 15-21). Even though the rejection of the people to create a Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) in two plebiscites, i.e., in 1990 and 1998, it does not contravene the constitutional provision that CAR has to be established in the future or when Cordillerans have renewed their quest to carve out another self-governing political unit in the Philippines, now in northern Luzon. In fact, a third bill²⁰ has been filed in the HoR, Bill (HB) No. 5487, on 11 December 2019, and another in the Senate, Senate Bill (SB) No. 1232 on 11 December 2019, both titled “An Act Establishing the Autonomous Region of the Cordillera (ARC).” For the first time, the Bills gained the support of all LGUs in the Cordilleran region.

Evidently, the 1987 constitutional provision to create autonomous regions in the Philippines afforded the impetus for indigenous nations, particularly Bangsa Moro and Cordillera or *Kaigorotan*,²¹ to renew their claim to their historic and pre-colonial homeland and assert their right to self-determination. The recognition of peoples’ differences in terms of ethnicity, culture, and religion and acknowledgment of their inherent rights to self-rule are deemed positive steps toward national integration.

Nonetheless, the issue of how autonomous these “autonomous regions” will be under a unitary centralized state has to be tested. In the case of the BARMM, the election of the region’s parliamentary government will still be held in May 2022 while in CAR, a consolidated bill to draft the Cordillera’s Organic Act has to be passed by both chambers of Congress, signed into law by the President, and approved in a plebiscite called for in the region before a regional government can be formed. Obviously, this will take a considerable amount of time.

In Search of Legitimacy

Attendant to nation-state building is the effort to fortify the democratic processes and bolster the legitimacy of a regime. A crucial aspect of this is a valuation of the country's electoral system. This is fundamental to political development as carrying out regular, orderly, and peaceful elections are mechanisms that warrant the effectual operation of modern representative democracy. Respectable elections reinforce the stability and legitimacy of the political community.

As Max Weber (1964, p. 382) says, legitimacy is "the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige." Beetham (1991) and Alagappa (1995) further argue that legitimacy involves society's collective evaluation of the state and leadership. It is the condition in which the governed accept as "rightful" the authority of their governors. It is based on the perception of shared norms and values, the perception that power is properly gained and exercised, and society's expression of consent.

The authority and the right to rule therefore is contingent and gauged by the popular support of its own constituencies. And whenever justification for authority is not accepted by society, then a crisis of legitimation occurs. To seek and maintain the legitimacy of a political order as well as ensure a responsive and accountable government, participation of its citizens in the process of governance becomes an essential ingredient. This process of legitimizing one's authority to rule is largely determined by the presence of a robust electoral system, A reputable system of election links citizens to each other, confirms the viability of the polity, and facilitates social and political integration.

It is indeed unfortunate that the character of elections in the Philippines, even after Corazon Aquino was catapulted to power as a

result of the 1986 People Power Revolution, has not been principally altered. Elections under the 1987 Constitution resembled not much different from the pre-martial law period. The Philippine party system hitherto is largely a one-party/multi-faction system. In spite the proliferation of political parties at the advent of the 5th Republic (post-martial law period), they are neither different from each other in terms of party platforms and programs of government nor ideologies, philosophies, standpoints, and viewpoints.

Thus, party-switching or “turncoatism” is a common feature of Philippine politics, both local and national. Loyalty shifts are lamely rationalized by the usual political cliché, “requirement of our constituents” or “dictates of patriotism.” Political principles (if any) and party affiliation take the back seat. Selection of political leaders in the country revolves around personalities rather than issues. Candidates’ commonalities, however, lie in their class bases, elite origins, and interests they represent.

In a country where around a fifth of the population lives below poverty line in 2018 and share a measly less than 5% of the national wealth (ADB u.d.), candidates who vie for the nation’s political leadership and pledge to represent the interest of the poor come from the elite class. Practically all politicians are wealthy and many landlords with large holdings. In 2015, it is estimated that a candidate for HoR or for mayor has to spend around PhP 73 million when the accumulated salary of a mayor for a three-year term amounts to approximately PhP 2 million and PhP 3 million for a representative at the HoR (Rose 2015). In the 2016 national elections, the 12 winners of the senatorial elections spent an average of PhP 107 million while some local government candidates spent even more than what the senatorial candidates had spent. (Rivas 2019).

For the presidential candidates, Senator Grace Poe was the

top spender and the top recipient of contributions among the five presidential candidates. She reported PhP 510 million in poll expenditures and almost PhP 512 million in campaign contributions. Then-Davao City mayor and now President Duterte was the 3rd top spender, using PhP 371 million out of the PhP 375 million in contributions that he received (Cepeda 2018). It is an open secret even so that the amount legally reported at the COMELEC, as per Article 11, Section 107 of the Omnibus Election Code, regarding election expenditures are way below the actual expenses disbursed and contributions accepted from wealthy individuals and businesses.

Rose (2015) estimates that a successful Philippine presidential candidate would spend three billion pesos while a senatorial candidate must spend at least half-a-billion pesos. Based on the 2019 Salary Standardization Law IV, the cumulative salary of a President for six years is at PhP 28.7 million and PhP 10.6 million for three years for a senator, yet billions of pesos are spent to get elected. The Financial Times appraises that election-related spending in the 2016 exceeded PhP 33 billion, about a third more than was spent during the 2010 general election (Salvosa and Chong 2016). As before, political power at the national and local levels in the Philippines has always been concentrated on the hands of the wealthy millionaires and billionaires. Understandably, movements of the poor advocating for social reforms and justice are effectively blocked particularly at the legislative and executive branches of government.

While an automated election system (AES) has exponentially accelerated the transmission of results and curbed cheating in the form of manipulated vote counting. On both theoretical and empirical accounts, the AES is not meant to be a silver bullet and was never intended to address corruption, fraud, and other irregularities associated with elections.

As we can see, since the use of electronic voting system or e-voting in the 2010 and 2016 presidential elections and the 2013 and 2019 mid-term elections, the usual vote-buying, intimidation and harassment of both voters and candidates, and the presence of armed goons in precincts have not been prevented. An NGO engaged in keeping elections safe, free, and peaceful says that:

We have observed that vote-buying became more rampant since automated polls took place in 2010 because the politicians cannot rig the vote-counting machines. Now, they go straight to organizers, operators in barangays. Ways of vote-buying became more creative (Panti, 2019).

Political dynasties linger to be a feature of the country's political landscape. Dynasties have not been dismantled in spite of the constitutional provision (Art 2, Sec. 26) to prohibit them, until a law is passed which define the details of its proscription. In as much as members of Congress are direct beneficiaries of political dynasties, it is unimaginable that such law would be promulgated in the near future.

In the 2013 mid-term elections, all 80 provinces were littered with political families and 74 percent of the elected members of the House of Representatives came from such dynastic groups (Purdey et.al. 2016). In 2016, Sidel (2018) affirms that there “remains ample evidence of the persistence of local ‘bossism’ and ‘dynasticism’ in municipalities, cities, congressional districts, and provinces across the Philippines” (p. 35). Indeed, the 2016 local and congressional mid-term election was dominated by dynasties (Flores 2019). The predicament of the peripheral sector to break their exclusion from governance remains a continuing challenge.

With regard to the party-list system (PLS)²² which is envisioned to enlarge the participation of the marginalized sectors in national

legislation and planning of programs and projects affecting sectoral interest, representation has similarly been hijacked by the elite and political dynasties. Kontra Daya (Against Fraud), an election watchdog, discloses that “nearly half” of the 134 party-list groups which participated in the 2019 mid-term elections do not only represent the marginalized sectors but also part of “political dynasties or officials already elected in other positions; represent special business interests; and/or possess questionable advocacies and nominees” (Umil 2019).

Despite safeguards established by election laws and regulations, duplicitous election practices have not been resolved. Palpably, the problem lies not in the administration of elections but on the manner candidates and electorates interpret elections. Candidates view elections as political investments whose dividends and profits can be “legitimately” derived while holding office vested with power. For the electorates, it is an opportunity (at least for the duration of the campaign and day of election) to claim goods and services which they seldom enjoy in between elections. Elections, in a way, have an equalizing function – the period of “getting even” where politicians are compelled to share their wealth.

The umbilical cord that ties politicians and big business interest remains strong. One who seeks public office in an election has to be a millionaire or supported by millionaires; and once in power, one has to pay back his or her political debts or recoup one’s political investments through corrupt practices. The confidentiality and sanctity of the secret ballot system have traditionally infringed upon the dictates of people’s economic needs and politicians’ obsession with power. The results of elections therefore need not necessarily reflect people’s mandate on the political leadership.

The deficiencies of the electoral system, in spite of attempts

to rectify them, have been effectively exploited, oftentimes by the incumbents, to thwart the choices of the people thereby undermining if not eroding the confidence the people have placed on it. Given such predicament, there is neither a cause for alarm nor surprise for victors in elections to receive more votes than the number of registered voters. The Philippine electoral system is essentially a mockery of a regime's legitimacy.

As political development requires a robust legitimate government where authority is derived lawfully and democratically accepted by the constituency, the Philippines is suffering a significant problem of civil legitimacy. Considering that one of the foremost ways in which civil society grants legitimacy to governments is through public elections, the pathologies of the country's electoral system continue to weaken the legitimacy of government. The weak party system, turncoats massive cheating like vote-buying, patronage politics, elitism, violence, and other corrupt practices of election officials have undermined the legitimacy not only of elected officials of government but also emasculated the processes and institutions of democracy.

While people are free to exercise their right of suffrage, their choice of political leaders are limited to the wealthy, oligarchs, and landed elite. The Philippine electoral system and institution of democratic rule has been captured by the elite and use them to either legitimize and sustain their power or seize power. In practice, the elite has more "democratic power" compared to the power of the masses. The increase in political participation of people need not necessarily an enlargement of their democratic space, as articulated in the employment of their democratic rights. In the Philippine case, it is the opposite.

Pursuit of Better Governance

So much of governance concerns the way that power is exerted and shared and the ways that state's finite (natural, human, technological, managerial, and capital) resources are rationally and appropriately allocated and utilized within society. The issue of "good governance" has particular relevance today. More recently democratization and good governance have been portrayed both as constitutive of political development and as conditions for sustained economic development in developing areas.

The participation of CSOs in governance allows that authority and power are shared in enacting policies and decisions affecting society's public life, aspirations, and interests. It upholds the principles of inclusiveness and democratization in governance, and hence the empowerment of people organized outside of state's apparatus. In the study of CSOs analysed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in seven countries in Asia and the Pacific in 2016 – notwithstanding that the number of registrations does not equate to the number of active NGOs or the number of constituents that each represents – Nepal and the Philippines are among the highest numbers of registered CSOs and philanthropic associations per capita (USAID 2017, pp. v-vi).

Culling from USAID's study, Table 1 shows that the Philippine NGO community as one of the largest in the developing world and the largest in Southeast Asia in a study on people empowerment and political inclusion co-published by the UN (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP], Asian Development Bank (ADB), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

In one of the ADB's civil-society policy briefs, it estimates that CSOs in the Philippines range up to 500,000, although only a fraction of this

Table 1 . Registered Civil Society Organizations and Philanthropic Associations

Country	Registered NGO	Registered NGOs per 1,000 people
Nepal	300,000	10.40
Philippines	279,499	2.73
Bangladesh	250,000	1.53
Indonesia	250,000	0.96
Cambodia	5,000	0.32
Thailand	14,000	0.21
Sri Lanka	1,500	0.07

Source: Accelerating progress: An empowered, inclusive and equal Asia and the Pacific UN, ADB, UNDP 2019. p. 37.

figure is registered as non-stock and non-profit NGOs and POs. While the number of “development-oriented” NGOs is put at somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 (ADB 2013). Although there is a popular notion that CSOs are not only large but also vibrant by developing country standards, this does not necessarily translate to active participation or inclusion of the marginalized sectors in governance.

As earlier discussed, the patronage character of Philippine politics is continuously eroding the constitutional provisions and lawful measures leading to stronger state-society collaboration. This has been evidenced by the restoration of élite-based political parties and comeback of traditional politicians from the time the late Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency when Marcos was forced to leave the country.

The enfeebled state-CSO collaboration in governance is by the same token demonstrated in local governance. In a study of urban CSO in Metro Manila, Shatkin (2000) confirms that the policy of decentralization²³ in the country was taken advantage by a variety

of politically powerful social groups, local political families, and international and domestic business interests which inhibit meaningful civil society participation, especially the underprivileged and deprived sectors of urban communities. Besides, the lack of institutional capacity among local governments in many cities and municipalities in the country as well as the existence of powerful economic interests at the local level that compete with CSOs for influence constrict any significant participation of people in decision making and governance of local affairs.

Graft and corruption continue to be a major issue in Philippine government and politics. Despite the repeated promises of every Philippine President since the post-war to extirpate graft and corruption in government, it has not been realized. In the 2019 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) reported by the Transparency International (TI), the Philippines ranked 113 least corrupt out of 180 countries. This is 14 notches below the 2018 ranking and 18 down from 2015 before Duterte becomes President. The country's rank may seem better compared during the Aquino III presidency when it ranked 129.

Among the 10 ASEAN countries, the Philippines is the 4th most corrupt as per TI's 2019 index. This rank has not changed since 1998 when other countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand have improved considerably and had overtaken the Philippines in terms of corruption Index. The aforesaid countries have been ranked 4th, 5th, and 6th least corrupt ASEAN countries in 2019 according to TI's index. In the Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Democracy Index for 2019, the Philippines slid down one notch to 54th place (Mourdoukoutas 2020).

Corruption evidently has a negative effect on the delivery of public services. It illegitimately denies the people of their legitimate right to basic human and social services – health, education, housing, and general welfare. It was estimated that the country loses PhP 700

billion a year due to corruption (Manhit 2020). This is a staggering amount which can significantly be used to address the nation's multi-dimensional socio-economic and political problems.

The COVID-19 pandemic in fact exposed the country's weaknesses in health care system and institutions. Despite the efforts of the government to mitigate the lethal consequences of COVID-19 through its community quarantine measures and rules on the use of face masks and social distancing, the Philippine health system failed to respond to the crisis as effective compared to the relatively less corrupt countries in Southeast Asia like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand. COVID-19 also reveals the inequality in health services in terms of coverage and quality of services between the rich and the poor, and public and private hospitals,

The World Health Organization (WHO) described that health care in the country is "fragmented," covering the health needs of the population in terms of preventive care, treatment, rehabilitation, and palliative. Similarly, it signifies the existence of large discrepancy between the quality and quantity of health services for the poor and the rich as well as poor and rich regions.

Responding to the health crisis, like COVID-19, requires a system of financial stability to health services that answer the cost of training human resources (medical staff along with proper salaries), maintenance and up to date medical facilities, medical research and other related needs. Although the Universal Health Care (UHC) Law (Republic Act No. 11223) has been passed in 2019 that will provide proper health care services for all, and a total of PhP 164.7 billion has been earmarked for the 2020 health budget (Gonzalez 2020), it is unsure if such resources will be judiciously spent where they are intended to be and whether the health system will be governed in a better way.

Summary, Conclusion, and Challenges

Political development is defined in various ways. One conceptual formulation deals with the creation and re-creation of national sovereignty and the concomitant exertion of nation- and state-building. Another is the fashionable view towards democratization, participation, and modernization through the exercise of freedom of association and expression. And more recently, good governance is one of the conditions for sustained economic development, rule of law, and the development of civil society. Ultimately, political development can be defined as an increase in national political unity and an increase in political participation.

Additionally, political development touches not just on formal constitutional and organizational arrangements but also on such informal institutions as actual political relationships, for example patron clientelism. Thus, changes in attitudes and political culture are relevant too. All this places limits on how far political development can be imported or imposed from without.

Political history and politics in the Philippines have been marked by powerful continuities and discontinuities witnessed by both periods of development and regression. Post-colonial governments ruled through the processes and institutions bequeathed by the former colonizer were utilized not to expand the democratic space and enlarge the participation of people but served the economic and political interests of the more powerful sector of society. Patterned after the American government except for the jury system and federal set-up, the institutions and systems of governance were unable to shore up the nation from post-war poverty, economic independence, and mass democracy.

The electoral system was employed by the political élites and privileged class to safeguard political and economic power that

further entrenched patron-client relationship. The nation, rather than be unified through the instrumentalities of the state, has been torn apart. The state has alienated itself from the people as corruption, centralization of power, and elitism have been unabated from the 3rd to 5th Republic covering nearly 75 years under 11 (excluding the current one) Presidents.

Powerful clans and political dynasties continue to hold power. Thus, the tools of democracy have become devices of violence – both naked and concealed – that drove the marginalized sectors of society to seek refuge to communist and separatist movements. The economic and political crisis that resulted from government's neglect, abuse of power, and callousness on the nation's welfare was aggravated under an authoritarian regime.

Patrimonial politics has been exacerbated, people's economic deprivation has deepened, and political and social conflicts have sharpened. The concentration of power to one person does not in any way contribute in invigorating a languid nation. Neither does it make the state more accountable to the people nor sensitive to their ideals and aspirations. Absolute power corrupts and hardens one's sensibilities.

The country's experience has shown that national will is capable of unleashing an indomitable strength that can bring what seems to be a formidable power of the state down to its knees. However, the downfall of a dictator does not ensure that economic and political problems would be easier to address. The process of rebuilding the nation and consolidating the power of state is far more difficult than the extra-constitutional seizure of power. As the country reconstructs itself from the mess left by the repressive regime, it persists to be vulnerable from political strife that can deflect its attention from stabilizing the economy.

The challenges and threats to political stability and legitimacy under a democratic regime remain real rather than imaginary. The instruments of political legitimacy – the electoral and party-list systems – are yet to evolve as effective mechanisms in articulating people's aspirations and support for the current political system. Although the Philippine electoral system is beset with procedural problems taken advantaged by the old and emerging political élites to secure, protect, and perpetuate their interests, the rising maturity of civil society – tempered and shaped through decades of political struggles – is expected to even-up the playing field in future electoral struggles.

Unfortunately, the centralism of the state stands as one of the major impediments in realizing effective and responsive governance. The intense and frequently personal nature and character of Filipino politics has largely contributed to the growing corrosion of political institutions. The agrarian-feudal political culture of client-patron relationship, which views governance as an individual affair, has yet to be transcended. The blurred dividing line between official function and personal duty needs to be accentuated.

Public officials persist to consider government funds as potential source of self-enrichment and the bureaucracy as an enterprise to be staffed by relatives and friends. Rent seeking is more predominant than making legitimate profit. It is thought that the best way to generate wealth is to take it from someone else or from the government rather than producing it themselves. Weber's concept of bureaucracy as an institution that delivers public goods and services in an impersonal and rational manner, bounded by rules and regulations, and staffed by competent and committed employees seems an alien doctrine if not simply an academic discourse.

In as much as centralism entails power and therefore about

politics, measures and movements toward greater autonomy must be placed within the context of political reform. Reform in Philippine governance necessitates the broadening of democracy, empowerment, and popular participation, thus increasing the role of civil society within and outside of existing political institutions.

The relationship between democracy, empowerment, and popular participation on the one hand and corruption and centralism on the other hand is inversely proportional – as the former increases the latter decreases and vice-versa. Concomitantly, enlarging the capacity of civil society enhances accountability of public officials, cultivates transparency on the provision of relevant and reliable information affecting public welfare, and strengthens predictability on the application of laws, regulations, and policies.

Corruption in government is not only prevalent but also unabated. It is the illegitimate and unethical use of public office for personal and private advantage. It covers excesses in the use of public authority. It is the intentional mis- and under-performance, transgression and neglect of recognized official duties that damage the public and harm public interests. It is self-perpetuating and expandable. If left unchecked, corruption will eventually destroy the entire society.

In the final analysis, modern governance is a matter of democratic rule where people's sovereignty is respected rather than trampled upon. It is a question where power is ultimately held in the hands of the populace in so far as political leaders serve as representatives of the multitude, and political institutions operate as instruments in advancing popular will. In like manner, the extent of political leaders' and institutions' legitimacy is limited by people's support.

The enduring challenge of political development in the country is principally threefold. One is drawing a unified approach in bringing together various ethnic, religious, and national groups

into the Philippine nation-state. A more appropriate and long-term structural reform in the country's politico-administrative system is essential rather than simply applying rules and laws that suit the interest of state's own concept of nation- building. There is a need to re-shape the country's political edges to accommodate differences in the country's diverse people in culture, ethnicity, and religion.

Two, is to combine political stability with political liberalization and democratization. Markedly, political liberalization advances economic growth and development rather than contributes to political instability. In Fish's and Choudhry's (2007) study, they conclude that democratization adjusts in the direction of a long-term equilibrium to which economic liberalization contributes markedly. Hence, the substantial empowerment of the people in the political, economic, and social affairs of society will eventually be manifested in economic development and progress.

And three, transforming political culture and actual political relationships, for example patron clientelism, to a more egalitarian, less hierarchical, and further symmetrical relationship between groups of political actors is a critical process in rejigging the substructure of the nation-state. This is relevant in political development as it is likewise concerned with informal institutions not only on formal constitutional and organizational arrangements.

As exhibited by the country's political history, the use of extra-constitutional and extra-legal means in asserting Filipinos' legitimate right to rule and claim a government that embodies their aspirations and national goals as a people is not a strange political act. The demands for better governance that began in the country's popular People Power uprising have yet to be fulfilled and its realization is contingent on the restructuring of Philippine political institutions that would ensure that democratic space is enlarged through a more

inclusive and participative governance, more representative electoral system, and deeper national consciousness.

¹ Human Development Index (HDI) is a multi-dimensional index of development as it is the combination of three development indices- health index, education index and income index. See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi> for details.

² McCarthyism is the term which refers to U.S. senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) who campaigned vociferously against alleged communists and Soviet spies in the US government and other institutions in the period 1950–4. McCarthyism is a practice of making accusations of subversion or treason without proper regard for evidence. This is also known as the “Red Scare” and threat of the possible spread of communism in the US.

³ Behaviouralism is an approach in political science that uses empirical research to validate its findings. It claims to explain political behaviour actions, and acts of individuals – rather than the characteristics of institutions such as legislatures, executives, and judiciaries – and groups in different social settings as they relate to the political system.

⁴ The Japanese occupied the Philippines between 1942 and 1945, when Imperial Japan occupied the Commonwealth of the Philippines, then in exile, during World War II. Given its brief occupation, it failed to effectively governed and influenced the country’s political system.

⁵ Cordillera is a Spanish word meaning “little cord.” It is generally used in geography to mean a series of parallel mountains that run along Northern Luzon. Filipinos born in Cordillera are generally called “Cordillerans” or collectively known as Igorots (from the mountain). However, it is more accurate to refer to them according to their ethno-linguistic groups - Ibaloi in southern Benguet to western Mountain Province, Bontok in Bontoc, Ifugaw in Ifugao province, Kalinga in the province of Kalinga, Isneg in the province of Apayao and Tinggian (or Itneg) in upland Abra.

⁶ The term “bangsa” or “bansa” is a Malay word that usually refers to nations, castes, descent groups or lines, races or estates. The composite term “Bangsa Moro,” refers to the “Moro Nation.” For the purpose of this paper, “Bangsa Moro” shall mean the “Moro Nation” and “Bangsamoro” as the “people” who embrace Islam as a religion and way of life especially those inhabiting southern Mindanao and Palawan provinces and Sulu archipelago.

⁷ This refers to a policy of the United States issued by U.S. President William McKinley on December 21, 1898. The policy reads in part:

Finally, it should be the earnest wish and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule (McFerson 2002, p. 268) (italics provided).

⁸ The Philippines hitherto an agricultural country despite the plan to make it an industrialized economy by 2000. The country’s agriculture sector employs almost 40% of the labour force and contribute 20 percent of GDP. See <<https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Philippines-AGRICULTURE.html>> for details.

⁹ The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is the agency constitutionally mandated to administer the conduct of elections.

¹⁰ The 1969 Presidential election was the time when Ferdinand Marcos run and won for the second term as President under the 1935 Constitution. The 1969 election was known as the “dirtiest, most violent and most corrupt” in Philippine modern history. (see Parsa 2000 and Patino and Velasco n.d. for details).

¹¹ Two (2) elections were held for members of the interim and regular parliament (Batasang Pambansa) on 07 April 1978 and 14 May 1984 respectively while two (2) others were presidential done in 1981 and 1986 where Marcos was proclaimed President. However, the 1986 snap election swept Marcos out of power as a result of the people’s uprising known as the “People’s Revolution.”

¹² These refer to the January and July 1973 plebiscite-referendums that approved the 1973 Constitution and endorsed Marcos’ rule beyond the provisions of the 1935 Constitution respectively. While the February 27-28 1975 allowed Marcos to exercise his powers under martial law and the 16-17 October 1976 referendum permitted the amendment to the 1973 Constitution on setting aside the interim national assembly and establishment of an interim parliament instead.

¹³ The 1935 Constitution provides that the President has a maximum of two (2) terms or eight (8) years (four [4] years per term). Marcos was elected under the 1935 Constitution in 1965 and re-elected in 1969, the only President in Philippine history who served two (2) consecutive terms. Officially his term ends in 1973. The declaration of martial law in 1972 empowered him to draft a new (1973) Constitution.

¹⁴ NGOs are intermediaries between the State and POs. They advocate and work for disadvantaged individuals, who are not necessarily their members. POs on the other hand are generally composed of disadvantaged individuals and work to advance their members’ material or social well-being. POs are grassroots organizations, and their members typically work on a voluntary basis.

¹⁵ Generally, NGOs and POs do not pay corporation or property taxes. Donations can also be made to NGOs on a tax-free basis. Hence, scrupulous politicians and government officials set up their own NGOs where ownership of properties is registered without paying taxes.

¹⁶ The “second-generation” and “third-generation” NGOs/POs refer to the difference in their development strategies. “Second-generation” basically employs community development which focuses on local inertia and develops capacities of local people to meet their own needs. The “third-generation” calls for a more political involvement in the form of support conscientization activities, and beyond that, for empowerment.

¹⁷ The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formerly part of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) formed in 1971 under Nur Misuari. In 1977, the MILF split from the MNLF under Salamat Hashim to veer away the support of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), an organization of about 54 countries (including non-state Palestine) and contended that the MNLF is more of a nationalist rather than Islamic in orientation.

¹⁸ Initially known as the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) during the administration of then President Benigno Aquino III (June 2010-June 2016). The law failed to pass in Aquino’s 16th Congress over questions on its constitutionality and the Mamasapano incident which resulted in the death of around 70 people (44 members of the Philippine National Police [PNP] elite Special Action Force [SAF], 18 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighters, 5 members of the

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and some other civilians) on 25 January 2015. The BBL was not passed into law until Congress went into recess in February 2016.

¹⁹ The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) region was first created on August 1, 1989 through Republic Act No. 6734. It was officially inaugurated on November 6, 1990. The region includes the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. In 2001, Marawi City (situated in Lanao del Sur province), and Basilan province opted to be part of ARMM after a plebiscite was conducted on 14 August 2001. ARMM through Republic A 9054 is currently the law that governs the region.

²⁰ House of Representatives' Bills filed that attempt to legalize Cordilleran autonomy are HoR Bills No. 5595 and 4649 submitted during the 15th and 16th Congress. Both Bills failed to pass (Cayabya M.J. 2014).

²¹ The root word Igorot (from the mountain) is the indigenous collective name of people who inhabit the Cordilleran region, ethnically known as Ibaloi, Bontok, Ifugaw, Kalinga, Isneg, and Itneg (refer also to note no. 5 above). Kaigorotan (referring to Cordilleran region) was used by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples – Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) in the week-long celebration of its youth week known as Kaigorotan Youth Week (KYW). (see <https://www.baguiheraldexpressonline.com/ncip-car-commemorates-kaigorotan-youth-week-throughout-march/>).

²² The party-list system is provided under Sec. 5 [1&2], Art. 6 of the 1987 Constitution. It allows the election of registered national and regional parties or organizations representing “labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law.” (italics supplied). The provision further stipulates that party-list representatives (PLR) shall constitute 20% of the total members of the House of Representatives (HOR) who are elected by legislative districts. On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act (PLSA) or Republic Act 7941 was enacted and further provides additional representation of the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, overseas Filipino workers, veterans, and professional sectors. Thus, a total of 12 sectors are to be represented in the HOR. To determine the number of seats a sector is eligible to occupy, PLSA says that “parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one (1) seat each.”

²³ The 1991 Local Government Code (LGC) is a watershed in Philippine decentralization. It intends to promote self-governance, consequently, lessening central control over local government units (LGUs).

²⁴ Page 56, picture credit: carnegieendowment.org/2019/01/10/philippine-politics-under-duterte-midterm-assessment-pub-78091

²⁵ Page 62, picture credit: www.worldbank.org/en/country/philippines/publication/philippines-economic-update-investing-in-the-future

²⁶ Page 64, picture credit: politics.com.ph/duterte-calls-for-a-truly-independent-philippines-emphasizes-value-of-freedom/politiko-independent



REFERENCES

- Abueva, J. (1971). *Ramon Magsaysay: a political biography*. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House.
- Abueva, J. (1988). Philippine ideologies and national development. In R. de Guzman and M. Refornia, (Eds.), *Government and politics of the Philippines*. Singapore: Oxford University Press Ltd. pp. 18-74.
- Alker, H.R., Jr. (1966). Causal inference and political analysis. In J. Bernd (Ed.). *Mathematical approaches in political Science*, Vol. II. Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, Arnold Foundation.
- Alagappa, M. (1995). The anatomy of legitimacy. In M. Alagappa (Ed.), *Political legitimacy in southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 11-30.
- Almond, G. (1970). *Political development*. Boston, Little Brown and Company.
- Almond, G. and Coleman, J.S (Eds) (1960). *The politics of the developing areas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Almond G., and Powell, B. (1966). *Comparative politics: a developmental approach*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Amnesty International (AI) (1990). *The Philippines: a summary of amnesty international's concerns*. ASA 35/02/90, London: Amnesty International. May.
- Anderson, B. (1983). *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* rev. ed. 1991. Verso: London, New York.
- Apter, D. (1965). *The politics of modernization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Japanese, Turkish, and Indonesian editions subsequently published)
- Apter, D. (1971). *Choice and the politics of allocation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2013). *ADB civil society briefs: overview of NGOs and civil society Philippines*. Retrieved from <<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28972/csb-phi.pdf>> February
- ADB (u.d.). *Poverty data: Philippines*. Retrieved from <<https://www.adb.org/countries/philippines/poverty>>
- Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) (u.d.). Retrieved from <https://parliament.bangsamoro.gov.ph/all-members/>
- Bell, S. (2002). *Economic governance and institutional dynamics*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Bendix, R. (1964). *Nation-building and citizenship: studies of our changing social order*. New York: Wiley.
- Beetham, D. (1991). *The legitimation of power*. London: MacMillan Education Ltd.
- Binder, L. (1962). *Iran: political development in a changing society*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Black, C. E. (1966). *The dynamics of modernization: a study in comparative history*, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Center of International Studies, New York: Harper & Row.
- Brillantes, A. B. (1990). *Élites and the Philippine presidency*. A report submitted to the College of Public Administration and the Ford Foundation
- Buendia, R. G. (1993). Colonialism and elitism in Philippine political development: assessing the roots of underdevelopment, *Philippine journal of public administration* 37 (2), 141-174.
- Buendia, R. G. (1997). The comprehensive and integrated delivery of social services: an appraisal of a strategy in social development. In: V. Bautista (ed.) *Social Development Reader*, (pp. 287-320). Quezon City: University of the Philippines.
- Buendia, R.G. (2019). *Charting the future of the Bangsamoro within the Philippine nation-state: governance challenges, issues and recommendations*. ADRI Occasional Paper 2. April. Makati:

- Stratbase, Alberto Del Rosario Institute (ADRI), DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.13637.91367
- Carvajal, N.C. (2013). NBI probes P10-B scam. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved from <<https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/443297/nbi-probes-p10-b-scam>> 12 July.
- Cayabyab, M. J. (2014, 22 September). Cordillera lawmakers revive autonomy bid". Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved from <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/639893/cordillera-lawmakers-revive-autonomy-bid>
- Cepeda, M. (2018). House OKs bill increasing allowed campaign expenses for candidates. Rappler. Retrieved from <<https://www.rappler.com/nation/203113-bill-allowing-increase-election-campaign-spending>> 22 May.
- Clarke, G. (1998). *The politics of NGO in south-east Asia: participation and protest in the Philippines*. London: Routledge.
- Constantino, R. (1974). Identity and consciousness: The Philippine experience. Paper presented in Symposium 3 of the 8th World Sociology. Congress, August 20. Toronto, Canada
- Constantino, R. (1970). The mis-education of the Filipino. *Journal of contemporary Asia* 1 (1). 20-36.
- Corpuz, O. D. (1989). *The roots of the Filipino nation*. Vols. 1 and 2, Quezon City: AKLAHI Foundation, Inc.
- Cruz, I. (2019, January 24). ARMM votes yes to BOL, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region Retrieved from <https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/682636/armm-votes-yes-to-bol-bangsamoro-autonomous-region/story/>.
- Cutright, P. (1963). National political development: measurement and analysis, *American Sociological Review* 28 (2), 253-264.
- Dahl, R. (1971). *Polyarchy: participation and opposition*. Yale University Press.
- Deutsch, K. (1961). Social mobilization and political development, *American Political Science Review* 55 (3), 634-647.
- Easton, D. (1953). *The political system. an inquiry into the state of political science*, New York: Knopf.
- Easton, D. (1965a). *A framework for political analysis*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Easton, D. (1965b). *A systems analysis of political life*, New York: Wiley.
- Eckstein, H. (1982). The Idea of political development: from dignity to efficiency, *World Politics* 34 (4), 451-486.
- Edgar, L., Marshall, C., and Bassett, M. (2006). *Partnerships: putting good governance principles in practice*. Ottawa: Institute on Governance (IOG).
- Eisenstadt, S.N. (1966). *Modernization: protest and change*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Esmaguél, P. and Tomacruz, S. (2019). Duterte's rant vs smartmatic puts comelec under scrutiny, Rappler Retrieved from <<https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/231887-duterte-rant-smartmatic-puts-comelec-under-scrutiny>> 1 June.
- Fish, M.S., and Choudhry, O. (2007). Democratization and economic liberalization in the postcommunist world, *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (3), 254-282.
- Flores, M. (2019). Dynasties and Duterte allies dominate Philippine midterm lineup. Retrieved from <<https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Dynasties-and-Duterte-allies-dominate-Philippine-midterm-lineup>> Feb 12.
- Freedom House (n.d.). *Freedom in the world research methodology*. Retrieved from <<https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology>> 6 May 2020.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Gellner, E. (1964). *Thought and change*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- GMA News and Public Affairs (2013). "Pork" audit reveals phony solon, ghost grantees, dubious receipts, illegal firms. Retrieved from <<https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/322393/pork-audit-reveals-phony-solon-ghost-grantees-dubious-receipts-illegal-firms/story/>> 20 August
- Gonzales, L. E. (2020). Fitch unit: 2020 budget to boost healthcare market growth. Manila Times. Retrieved from <<https://www.manilatimes.net/2020/01/11/business/business-top/fitch-unit-2020-budget-to-boost-healthcare-market-growth/673222/>> 11 January.
- Gonzalez, J. & Buendia, R. G. (2003). *The continuing people power*. In J. Funston (Ed.), *Government and politics of southeast Asia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 252-290.
- Gowing, P. and McAmis, R. (eds.) (1979). *The Muslim Filipinos*. Solidaridad Publishing House, Manila.
- Gusfield J. (1967). Tradition and modernity: misplaced polarities in the study of social change. In *American Journal of Sociology* 72 (4), 351-362.

- Gutierrez, E. (1994). *Ties that bind: a guide to the family, business and other interests in the ninth Congress*. Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism.
- Hudson, M. (1968). *Super-imperialism: the economic strategy of American empire*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Huntington, S. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huntington, S. (1965). Political development and political decay, *world politics* 17 (3), 386-430.
- Huntington, S. (1987). The goals of political development. In M. Weiner and S. Huntington (Eds.), *Understanding political development: an analytic study*. Longman Higher Education, pp. 3-32.
- Huntington, S. and Dominguez, J. I. (1975). Political development. In: F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby (Eds.), *Handbook of political science*. Vol. 3. Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley.
- Javellana-Labog, J. (2013). Houses of corruption. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. Retrieved from <<https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/467311/houses-of-corruption>> 20 August.
- Jaguaribe, H. (1973). *Political development: a general theory and a Latin American case study study*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers Inc.
- Jocano, L. (1975). *The Philippines at the Spanish contact: some major accounts of early Filipino society and culture*. Manila, MCS Enterprise.
- Kohn, H. (1961). *The idea of nationalism*. New York: Macmillan.
- Korten, D. (1990). From relief to people's movement. Getting to the 21st century: voluntary action and the global agenda. West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press (pp. 113-132).
- Lande, C. (1966). *Leaders, factions, and parties: the structure of Philippine politics*. Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University.
- Landes, D. (1991). Rethinking development. In *Dialogue* 91., 66-71.
- Lerner, D. (1958). *The passing of traditional societies: modernizing the middle east*. New York: Free Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: economics development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Association* 53(1), 69-105.
- Lipset, S.M. (1963). *Political man: The social bases of politics*. New York: Anchor Books
- Manhit, D. (2020). That other virus—corruption. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. Retrieved from <: <https://opinion.inquirer.net/128184/that-other-virus-corruption#ixzz6NWVVvt98>
- McFerson, H.M. (Ed.) (2002). *Mixed blessing: the impact of the American colonial experience on politics and society in the Philippines*. Westport: Greenwood Publishing.
- Mehta, V.R. (1978). *Beyond Marxism: towards an alternative perspective*. New Delhi: Manohar.
- Miller, J. (n.d.). Religion in the Philippines. Retrieved from <https://asiasociety.org/education/religion-philippines> 5 Mar 2020
- Moore, B. (1966). *Social origins of dictatorship and democracy: lord and peasant in the making of the modern world*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Mourdoukoutas, P. (2020). Duterte is turning Philippines into a more corrupt and less democratic state. *Forbes*. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2020/01/24/duterte-is-turning-philippines-into-a-more-corrupt-and-less-democratic-state/#2ba07bb42768>> 24 January.
- Needler, M. (1968). *Political development in Latin America*. Random House
- Organski, A.F.K. (1965). *The stages of political development*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Panti, L. (2019). Pulse Asia: Pinoys who believe May 2019 elections were free from cheating down by 9%, GMA News Online. Retrieved from <<https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/703755/pulse-asia-pinoys-who-believe-may-2019-elections-were-free-from-cheating-down-by-9/story/>> 7 Aug.
- Park, H.I.S. (1984). *Human needs and political development: a dissent to utopian solutions*. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company.
- Parreno, E. (1998). Pork. In C. Balgos and S. Coronel (Eds.), *Pork and other perks: corruption and governance in the Philippines*. Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. pp. 32-55.
- Parsa, M. (2000). *States, ideologies, and social revolutions: a comparative analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Parsons, T. (1951). *The social system*. New York: The Free Press.
- Parsons, T. (1961). An outline of the social system. Puerto Rico: University of Puerto Rico,
- Parsons, T. (1964). *Social structure and personality*. London: The Free Press.
- Parsons, T. (1969). *Politics and social structure*. New York: The Free Press.

- Parsons, T. (1971). *The system of modern societies*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Patino, P. and Velasco, D. (n.d.). Election violence in the Philippines. Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, Philippine Office. Retrieved from <<https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/philippinen/50071.pdf>> 5 Apr 2020.
- Phelan, J.L. (1959). *The hispanization of the Philippines*. Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press.
- Pierre, J. and Peters, B.G. (2000). *Governance, politics and the state*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Purdey, J., Tadem, T.E., and Tadem, E. (2016). Political dynasties in the Philippines, *South East Asia Research*, 24 (3), 328-340.
- Pye, L. (1963). *Communications and political development*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Pye, L. (1965). Introduction: political culture and political development. In L. Pye and S. Verba, *Political culture and political development*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Pye, L. (1966). *Aspects of political development: an analytic study*. Boston: Little Brown and Company.
- Randall V. and Theobald, R. (1985). *Political change and underdevelopment: a critical introduction to third world politics*. London: Macmillan.
- Republic of the Philippines (1987). *Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines*.
- Republic of the Philippines (1991). *Local Government Code*.
- Republic of the Philippines (1993). Supreme Court G.R. No. 84607. Retrieved from (https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/mar1993/gr_84607_1993.html)
- Republic of the Philippines (1995). *Party-List System Act (PLSA) (Republic Act 7941)*. 3 March.
- Republic of the Philippines (2018). *Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Republic Act 11054)*. 27 July. Retrieved from <<https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2018/07jul/20180727-RA-11054-RRD.pdf>>
- Republic of the Philippines (1985). Commission on Elections (COMELEC). *Omnibus Election Code*. Retrieved from <<https://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=References/RelatedLaws/OmnibusElectionCode>>
- Riggs, F. (1964). *Administration in developing countries—the theory of prismatic society*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Riggs, F. (1970). *Administrative reform and political responsiveness: a theory of dynamic balancing*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Rivas, R. (2019). How much do you need to become senator? Rappler. Retrieved from <<https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/229366-how-much-cash-do-you-need-senator>> 1 May.
- Rivera, T. (1994). *Landlords and capitalists: class, family and state in Philippine manufacturing*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press.
- Rocamora, J. (1998). Corruption in the Philippines: a beginner's guide. In C. Balgos and S. Coronel (Eds.) *Pork and other perks: corruption and governance in the Philippines* Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. pp. 8-31.
- Rose, J. (2015). How much does it cost to run for Congress in the Philippines? Retrieved from <<https://utopiayouarestandinginit.com/2015/03/01/how-much-does-it-cost-to-run-for-congress-in-the-philippines/>>
- Rostow, W. W. (1960). *The five-stages of growth – a summary*. The stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 4–16.
- Rostow, W.W. (1971). *Politics and the stages of growth*. Cambridge University Press.
- Rudolph, L. and Rudolph, S. (1967). *Modernity of tradition: political development in India*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Russett, B. M., Deutsch, K., Lasswell, H., Alker, H. (1964). *World handbook of political and social indicators*. New Haven: Yale University Press
- Rustow, D.A. (1967). *A world of nations: problems of political modernization*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Salvosa, F. and Chong, L. (2016). Campaigns leading to Monday's elections distributed largesse across the economy. *Financial times*. Retrieved from <<https://amp.ft.com/content/1354d2f4-1394-11e6-91da-096d89bd2173>> 9 May.
- Schirmer, D. and Shalom, S. (Eds.) (1987). *The Philippines reader: A history of colonialism, neo-colonialism, dictatorship, and resistance*. Quezon City: Ken Incorporated.
- Shatkin, G. (2000). Obstacles to empowerment: local politics and civil society in metropolitan Manila, the Philippines, *Urban Studies* 37 (12), 2357-2375.
- Shils, E. (1970). Political development in the new states: the will to be modern. in: S.N. Eisenstadt (Ed.) *Readings in Social Evolution and Development*. Jerusalem: Pergamon Press. pp. 379-420.
- Sidel, J.T. (2018). Patrons, bosses, dynasties, and reformers in local politics. In: M. Thompson and

- E.V. Batalla (Eds.), *Routledge handbook of the contemporary Philippines*. Oxon and New York: Routledge. pp. 26-37.
- Smith, B. (2003). *Understanding third world politics: theories of political change and development*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.
- Somjee A.H. (1982). *Political capacity in developing countries*. London: Macmillan.
- Tan, Samuel (1993). *Internationalization of the Bangsamoro struggle*, The Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila.
- Tangcangco, L. (1977). The politics of election administration: the modernization program of the Philippine electoral system, *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, 41 (1-4), 127-174.
- Tancangco, L. (1988). The electoral system and political parties in the Philippines. In R. de Guzman and M. Reforma, (Eds.), *Government and politics of the Philippines*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, Ltd., pp. 77-112.
- Transparency International (n.d.) *Philippines Corruption Rank*. Retrieved from <<https://tradeconomics.com/philippines/corruption-rank>>
- Umil, A.M. (2019). *Vote for party-list groups that represent marginalized, underrepresented – Kontra Daya*. 9 May. Retrieved from < <https://www.bulatlat.com/2019/05/09/vote-for-party-list-groups-that-represent-marginalized-underrepresented-kontra-daya/>> 2 Apr 2020.
- United Nations, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UN, ADB, UNDP) (2019). *Accelerating progress: An empowered, inclusive and equal Asia and the Pacific*. Bangkok: UNDP.
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2019). *Human development report 2019: beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: inequalities in human development in the 21st century*. Retrieved from <<http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf>> 2 Apr. 2020.
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2017). *The 2016 CSO sustainability index for Asia*. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from <www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/2016-Asia-CSOSI-Report.pdf> 5 Apr. 2020.
- Villacorta, W. (1990). Political contestation in the Philippines: rhetorics and reality. In N. Mahmood and Z.H. Ahmad (eds.) *Political contestation: case studies from Asia*. Singapore: Sheinemann Asia-Octopus Publishing Asia Pte. Ltd.
- Villarin, T. (1996). *A Guide to NGO-PO Partnership with Local Governments*. Quezon City: KAISAHAN.
- Weber, M. (1964). *Theory of social and economic organization* In T. Parsons (Ed). New York: Free Press.
- Wiarda, H. (1991). Concepts and models in comparative politics. In D. Rustow and K. P. Erickson (Eds.) *Comparative political dynamics: global research perspectives*. New York: HarperCollins.
- World Bank (WB) (2018). *Making growth work for the poor: a poverty assessment for the Philippines*. 01 January 1. Retrieved from <<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/273631527594735491/pdf/126194-WP-REVISED-OUO-9.pdf>> 2 Apr 2020.
- WB (1991). *Managing development – the governance dimension*. A Discussion Paper. Washington D.C. 29 April. Retrieved from <<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/884111468134710535/pdf/34899.pdf>> 29 March 2020.
- WB (2006). *A Decade of measuring the quality of governance: governance matters 2007, worldwide governance indicators, 1996-2007*. Washington D.C. Retrieved from < <http://etico.iiep.unesco.org/sites/default/files/wbi2007-report.pdf>> 20 March 2020.
- Wurfel, D. (1988). *Filipino politics: development and decay*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Zakaria, F. (2003). *The future of freedom. illiberal democracy at home and abroad* (Rev. Ed.). New York: W. W. & Company, Inc.



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ADR Institute gratefully acknowledges all those who have extended their support, cooperation, and commitment to the development of this project. This publication would not have materialized without their help.

We are fortunate enough to engage with insightful persons from different sectors, namely: the academe, public and private sectors, as well as civil society organizations, who have shared their expertise and have actively contributed to discussions in various fora.

We would also like to thank Prof. Victor Andres ‘Dindo’ Manhit, President of the ADR Institute, for his leadership, vision, and guidance in making this endeavor possible.

Last but not the least, we would like to thank the following for their hard work and dedication and for working tirelessly towards the completion of this project:

Our design consultant, Ms. Carol Manhit, for the publication layout and cover design;

And the rest of the ADRI team headed by Executive Director, Francesco “Paco” Pangalangan, Deputy Executive Director for Programs, Ms. Ma. Claudette Guevara, Deputy Executive Director for Research, Dr. Jimmy Jimenez, External Affairs and Social Media Manager, Ms. Krystyna Dy, and Research Associate, Ms. Clarisse Dacanay.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Rizal G. Buendia

Non-resident Fellow

Stratbase ADR Institute

Dr. Buendia is an independent political analyst, consultant, and researcher in Southeast Asian Politics and International Development, based in Wales, UK.

He has had a long career in the academe, having served in numerous Philippine and international educational institutions. Among his posts held include serving as a former Teaching Fellow at the Politics and International Studies Department and the Department of Development Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. In addition, Dr. Buendia was the previous Chair of the Political Science Department at De La Salle University in Manila. He was also a Visiting Professor at the Waseda Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies (WIAPS) Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan.

His publications include the book, *Ethnicity and Sub-nationalist Independence Movements in the Philippines and Indonesia: Implications for Regional Security* (2002). He also wrote significant monographs on Bangsamoro, ASEAN, and regional geopolitics. These include *Recruitment and Movement of Professionals under the ASEAN Economic Community* (2016), *Revisiting the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint* (2016); and *The Politics of the Bangsamoro Basic Law* (2015). In addition, Dr. Buendia contributed several articles published in international peer-reviewed journals and wrote book chapters on ethno-nationalism, Bangsamoro politics, indigenous

peoples' rights, conflict management, and regional cooperation, Southeast Asian governance, public administration, human rights, democracy, and social policies.

He is currently a member of the International Editorial Board of the Asian Journal of Criminology (Melbourne, Australia), Founding Member of the Asian Criminological Society (Beijing, China), and former Editor in Chief of the Asia Pacific Social Science Journal. He is also a member of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS), Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA), the International Political Science Association (IPSA), and the Phi Gamma Mu International Honor Society-Beta Chapter.

Dr. Buendia has an extensive educational background in governance and policy, having obtained his Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) degree in Political Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS) as a grantee of the TODA Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research's Doctoral Fellowship Program, the Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program, Toyota Foundation and the Japan Foundation Asia Center's research fellowship Program. He completed his Master of Public Administration (MPA) with Highest Distinction at the University of the Philippines-Diliman (National College of Public Administration and Governance [NCPAG]).

Dr. Buendia also contributes as a member of civil society through his work as a volunteer, and currently sits as a Trustee on the Board of Trustees for Citizens Advice (Hounslow Borough of London) where he assists in strategic planning and decision making, particularly in the areas of education, housing, employment, and general welfare.

The views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute or any of its officers and trustees.

The author is solely responsible for its content.



STRATBASE ADRI FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

9th Floor
6780 Ayala Avenue
Makati City,
Philippines 1200

www.adrinstitute.org